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STRUCTURAL BIASES IN STRUCTURAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
JONATHAN S. GOULD† & DAVID E. POZEN‡
Structural constitutional law regulates the workings of government and supplies the
rules of the political game. Whether by design or by accident, these rules sometimes
tilt the playing field for or against certain political factions—not just episodically,
based on who holds power at a given moment, but systematically over time—in
terms of electoral outcomes or policy objectives. In these instances, structural constitutional law is itself structurally biased.
This Article identifies and begins to develop the concept of such structural biases,
with a focus on biases affecting the major political parties. Recent years have witnessed a revival of political conflict over the basic terms of the U.S. constitutional
order. We suggest that this phenomenon, and a large part of structural constitutional conflict in general, is best explained by the interaction between partisan
polarization and structural bias, each of which can intensify the other. The Article
also offers a typology of structural biases, keyed to the contemporary United States
but potentially applicable to any system. To date, legal scholars have lagged social
scientists in investigating the efficiency, distributional, and political effects of governance arrangements. The concept of structural bias, we aim to show, can help
bridge this disciplinary gap and thereby advance the study of constitutional design
and constitutional politics.
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Perhaps the most basic task of a constitution is to supply the rules
of “the political game.”1 Constitutions establish frameworks within
which public power is allocated, government decisions are made, and
partisan competition is waged. They also establish institutions with the
authority to refine the rules over time. Yet while no one disputes that
structural constitutional choices can influence political behavior and
policy outcomes, the precise nature of that influence is often difficult
to predict and may change as circumstances change.2 Constitutional
structure matters; but how?
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1 Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 659 (2011).
2 “Even after decades of [comparative constitutional] scholarship on political
institutions,” one leading scholar observes, “our knowledge of the interaction of particular
practices with environmental factors is quite limited, and predictions of how institutions
will operate are, at best, probabilistic guesses.” Tom Ginsburg, Introduction to
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 1, 1 (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2012).
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In the United States today, questions about the desirability and
design of structural constitutional arrangements are typically
approached in one of two ways. The first focuses on the political affiliations of current officeholders. Whichever political bloc controls a
given institution in a given period will tend to benefit from that institution and from any increase in its authority. A more powerful presidency benefits whichever party holds the presidency, a more powerful
Supreme Court benefits those who are ideologically aligned with a
majority of the Justices, and so on. Knowing this, partisans may try to
strengthen the institutions they lead or to weaken those they do not.3
Many of these efforts can be expected to wash out sooner or later, on
such accounts, as the parties trade control over the organs of government—a phenomenon that has been occurring with increasing frequency in the political branches.4
A second approach to structural constitutional analysis focuses
not on transient political alignments but rather on timeless principles
endorsed by all sides, at least at the level of generality at which they
are invoked. In an optimistic key, for example, federalism and the separation of powers are often hailed as safeguards of liberty.5 In a critical register, the two-senators-per-state rule is often condemned as
inconsistent with political equality.6 Across the globe, students of constitutional design similarly ask about the relationship between structural choices and widely shared goals such as avoidance of tyranny or
preservation of effective state functioning.7
Both of these approaches, one that emphasizes cycles of institutional control and the other that abstracts away from distributions of
43872-nyu_97-1 Sheet No. 33 Side A
04/20/2022 12:00:09

3 See generally Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Institutional Flip-Flops, 94 TEX. L.
REV. 485 (2016) (discussing this phenomenon and the “flip-flopping” of positions on
structural issues that it can produce).
4 See infra notes 151–53 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1969 (2019) (stating that “our
system of federalism is fundamental to the protection of liberty”); NLRB v. Canning, 573
U.S. 513, 525 (2014) (“We recognize, of course, that the separation of powers can serve to
safeguard individual liberty . . . .”). These consequentialist claims are almost never
specified or developed in any rigorous fashion. See David E. Pozen & Adam M. Samaha,
Anti-Modalities, 119 MICH. L. REV. 729, 749–50, 774–79, 787 (2021).
6 See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE
CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 148–51 (2012); JAMES LINDLEY WILSON, DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY
175–92 (2019).
7 See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Z. Huq & Mila Versteeg, The Coming Demise of
Liberal Constitutionalism?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 239, 248 (2018) (“Since the American
Founding, after all, the field of constitutional design has been largely oriented to resisting
tyranny, among other goals.”); AZIZ Z. HUQ, Hippocratic Constitutional Design, in
ASSESSING CONSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE 39, 56–66 (Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Huq eds.,
2016) (arguing that the most plausible external measure of “constitutional success” is
avoidance of state collapse).
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8 See, e.g., Zachary S. Price, Symmetric Constitutionalism: An Essay on Masterpiece
Cakeshop and the Post-Kennedy Supreme Court, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1273, 1306–07 (2019)
(“A theory of executive power or federalism or any other structural principle that is
acceptable only if exercised by one’s co-partisans is not a legal theory but an act of force.”).
9 See infra Section III.A.6.
10 See infra Sections II.B, III.A.
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power altogether, offer valuable insights into constitutional law. But
they miss something important about constitutional politics.
Throughout U.S. history, various constitutional arrangements have
been associated with values and agendas that are fiercely contested
along partisan lines regardless of who holds office at any particular
moment. In these instances, political actors may contend that structural constitutional law is itself structurally biased—that the rules of
the political game systematically tilt the playing field, whether by
design or by accident, for or against the policy objectives or electoral
fortunes of one faction or another. And they may be right.
This Article introduces and develops the idea of structural biases
in structural constitutional law. It is especially important, one often
hears, that a society’s rules for organizing government not be formulated or applied in a politically partisan manner.8 But structural biases
are bound to exist in any constitutional system with well-defined political blocs, including our own. In such a system, there can be no truly
neutral principles of constitutional governance, whether for formulating policy, administering laws, or facilitating electoral competition.
Even technical-seeming arrangements will tend to favor certain outcomes favored by certain parties. Any set of rules to structure the lawmaking process, for instance, implicitly encodes contestable judgments
about how easy or hard it should be to devise or expand regulatory
and social welfare regimes. Any set of electoral rules reflects a choice
among alternative modes of constructing political representation and
accountability. In these domains and others, prevailing practices may
be much more aligned with one side’s medium- and long-term interests than a plausible alternative arrangement would be.
A few structural constitutional biases have been the subject of
heated debate in recent years. Most prominently, Democrats have
complained that the rules governing the apportionment of senators
and the allocation of Electoral College votes are biased in favor of the
Republican Party, given the spatial distribution of partisans.9 These
complaints are just the tip of the iceberg, however. As we will show,
ideological, geographic, and demographic polarization have worked in
tandem to generate or exacerbate structural biases—as well as partisan strife regarding these biases—across nearly every area of structural constitutional law.10 Because Democrats now have more

43872-nyu_97-1 Sheet No. 34 Side A

04/20/2022 12:00:09

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\97-1\NYU102.txt

April 2022]

unknown

STRUCTURAL BIASES

Seq: 5

13-APR-22

12:25

63

12
13
14

See
See
See
See

infra
infra
infra
infra

Section
Section
Section
Section

III.A.1.
III.A.4.
II.A.
I.B.

04/20/2022 12:00:09

11

43872-nyu_97-1 Sheet No. 34 Side A

ambitious legislative agendas than do Republicans, for instance, the
many veto points in the federal lawmaking process have a disparate
negative impact on Democratic policymakers.11 Conversely, the leftleaning tilt of the civil service means that legal limits on presidential
control over the bureaucracy disproportionately disadvantage
Republican chief executives.12
The politicization of constitutional structure marks both a dramatic new development in contemporary constitutionalism and a
reversion to historical precedent. Although conflict over structural
biases was relatively quiet in the late twentieth century, such conflict
has riven American politics since the Founding.13 For centuries, partisans have fought to entrench structural biases that benefit their
agendas and to dismantle those that stand in their way. As straightforward as this observation might seem—and certain structural biases, at
certain points in time, are straightforward, even if many others are
subtler—legal scholarship has not taken any sort of systematic
account of this phenomenon.14 Current disputes over institutions like
the Electoral College and the “deep state” cannot be well understood
without being placed in this larger context.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I defines key terms, outlines
the scope of our study, and situates it in the existing literature. Part II
briefly reviews earlier cycles of conflict over structural biases before
turning to the present period. It explains that contemporary political
conditions lend themselves to contestation over the basic terms of our
constitutional order much more so than the conditions that prevailed
a generation ago. Part III provides a typology of structural biases,
potentially applicable to any system but elaborated with reference to
the United States today. This typology helps us understand current
constitutional flashpoints and may predict future ones. Finally, Part
IV explores possible lessons from our descriptive and analytical
account—for the coming phase of U.S. constitutionalism, for constitutional designers and reformers, and for scholars seeking to understand
how legal institutions shape electoral and policy disputes. The concept
of structural bias, we aim to show throughout, deserves a central place
in the study of constitutional politics.

43872-nyu_97-1 Sheet No. 34 Side B

04/20/2022 12:00:09

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\97-1\NYU102.txt

64

unknown

Seq: 6

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

13-APR-22

12:25

[Vol. 97:59

I
FRAMING

THE

INQUIRY

A. Definitions and Caveats
Both terms in this Article’s title deserve some explanation. By
“structural constitutional law,” we refer broadly to the authoritative
legal norms that guide the workings of government and the distribution of government power.15 These norms may be grounded in the text
of the canonical document, of course. But they may also be part of
what is often called the “small-c constitution,” or the larger “web of
documents, practices, institutions, norms, and traditions that structure
American government.”16 Structural constitutional law, on this understanding, encompasses many legal sources not taught in traditional
constitutional law classes. Framework statutes such as the
Administrative Procedure Act and the Congressional Budget Act of
1974,17 cameral rules in each house of Congress,18 rules considered
binding within the executive branch,19 and election laws enacted by
Congress and the states20 may all qualify—just so long as they authoritatively determine the roles, powers, or procedures of government
institutions. Expansive as it may seem, this approach to structural constitutional law is consistent with the small-c literature.21 The Article’s
field of inquiry could also be thought of as “structural public law,”
although we prefer “constitutional” to “public” for the way it highlights how this body of law constitutes as well as constrains the state.

43872-nyu_97-1 Sheet No. 34 Side B
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15 Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term—Foreword: Looking for
Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 33 (2016) (“[T]he focus of structural
constitutional law . . . has been on how power is distributed between and among”—and we
would add within—“government institutions.”).
16 Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1082 (2013).
17 See Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 717 (2005).
18 See JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 267–301 (2017); Jonathan S. Gould, Law Within Congress, 129
YALE L.J. 1946, 1959–63 (2020).
19 See Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L.
REV. 1239 (2017).
20 Under the Constitution’s Elections Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1, state
legislatures share with Congress the authority to regulate federal congressional elections.
21 See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2,
33 (2014) (“While small-c theories come in many different stripes, they share a
commitment to assimilating into constitutional analysis ‘all rules which directly or
indirectly affect the distribution or the exercise of the sovereign power in the state’ . . . .”)
(quoting A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
22 (8th ed. 1915)); Primus, supra note 16, at 1082 (“[S]mall-c theorists often hold that rules
not appearing in the text are nevertheless constitutional because they are important to the
structure of government . . . .”).
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22 Roger B. Myerson, Economic Analysis of Constitutions, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 925, 927
(2000); accord Levinson, supra note 1, at 659.
23 See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth, The Legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias, 37 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 567, 571 (2003) (“Before a bias can be condemned or even identified, one must
identify a baseline: a goal that the bias is frustrating; a judgment that it may contaminate
but should not.”).
24 See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV.
1003, 1011–16 (2011).
25 See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch,
J., concurring).
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By “structural biases,” we refer to situations in which constitutional arrangements disadvantage a political or ideological faction and
its policy agenda over multiple election cycles, even when the arrangements are ostensibly neutral with respect to party, ideology, and
policy. Structural constitutional law is sometimes described as setting
out “the rules of the game by which politicians gain and use power.”22
The concept of structural bias prompts us to ask who is helped or
harmed by these rules, and under what circumstances. More formally:
An institutional arrangement is structurally biased against a political
faction when, for the foreseeable future, it asymmetrically harms that
faction in its overall effects, relative to a normatively and practically
plausible alternative arrangement. If an electoral institution is biased
against faction A and in favor of faction B, A’s candidates will be apt
to lose races to B’s candidates even when the former enjoy equal or
greater popular support. If a policymaking process is biased against A
and in favor of B, A’s officeholders will face greater challenges than
B’s officeholders in effectuating their agenda even when A’s agenda
enjoys equal or greater popular support.
To identify a structural bias is not necessarily to identify a flaw in
the system. Whether any structural biases that exist are ultimately justified or unjustified is a separate question, the answer to which
requires both a positive grasp of their effects and a normative theory
of constitutional politics and constitutional design. Although the term
“bias” is often used as a pejorative, we deploy it in a strictly descriptive, value-neutral manner—to describe how institutional arrangements create winners and losers. Our choice of label is not meant to
indicate that any given structural bias is harmful on balance, only that
it is harmful to the interests of those against whom the bias operates.
As scholarship on bias in other domains has pointed out, bias can
exist only relative to a baseline.23 For many controversial features of
structural constitutional law, a baseline is named or implied by critics.
The Senate filibuster is typically contrasted with simple-majority
voting,24 Chevron deference with de novo judicial review of agency
action,25 single-member legislative districts with proportional repre-

43872-nyu_97-1 Sheet No. 35 Side B

04/20/2022 12:00:09

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\97-1\NYU102.txt

66

unknown

Seq: 8

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

13-APR-22

12:25

[Vol. 97:59

sentation,26 and so on.27 In these instances, there is an intuitive and
well-established (though still disputable) reference point for current
arrangements. For other features of structural constitutional law, however, an appropriate baseline for comparison is harder to specify. One
may believe that existing law gives the president too much power or
too little power, but there is no obvious quantum of presidential
power against which the status quo can be assessed. Every constitutional rule in every system might be seen as “biased” relative to some
imaginable alternative that would better serve some end. While we
cannot entirely escape the ubiquitous problem of “baseline hell” in
analyzing contested legal arrangements,28 we focus on arrangements
that systematically advance the electoral or policy interests of one discrete bloc over another, relative to an identifiable substitute used in
other contexts or jurisdictions.29
The number and character of veto points in the legislative process
provides an illustration. For any set of rules that govern the making of
legislation, one could add or subtract, or strengthen or weaken, veto
points. Every possible legislative process could thus be said to be
simultaneously biased both in favor of action (relative to more vetoladen alternatives) and in favor of inaction (relative to less veto-laden

43872-nyu_97-1 Sheet No. 35 Side B
04/20/2022 12:00:09

26 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign
Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1732–33 (1999).
27 When incumbent officeholders enact a reform intended to entrench their side’s
policies or power against future change, see generally Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs,
Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400 (2015) (providing numerous
examples of this phenomenon), the natural baseline for charges of structural bias is the
pre-reform state of the law.
28 Rick Hills, Anti-Discrimination Law in Baseline Hell, BALKINIZATION (July 20, 2020,
9:30 AM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/07/anti-discrimination-law-in-baselinehell.html [https://perma.cc/289M-75V2].
29 An alternative approach to identifying and assessing structural bias might stipulate a
normative standard, and then compare every arrangement in every domain against that
baseline—for example, majoritarianism. See Lawrence Lessig, US: A(nother) Minoritarian
Nation, MEDIUM (Mar. 17, 2021), https://medium.lessig.org/us-a-nother-minoritariannation-fcee9d68605e [https://perma.cc/8RRP-GMWD]. The more an arrangement deviated
from the standard, the more biased it would be. While this approach may be invaluable for
certain sorts of critical analyses and reform projects, see infra notes 44–59 and
accompanying text (discussing scholarship that highlights democratic deficits in the U.S.
Constitution’s design), it requires the adoption of a universal benchmark of unbiasedness
that is bound to be both contestable in principle and difficult to translate to certain
settings. From the standpoint of majoritarianism, say, which ways of allocating authority in
Congress among party leaders, committee chairs, and rank-and-file members are less
biased than others? Does adopting a more expansive approach to federal preemption of
state law lead to more majoritarian policy outcomes? Such questions admit of no clear
answers. This Article’s method of conceptualizing structural bias is less satisfying in one
sense, relying on a series of institution-specific pairwise comparisons instead of any one
global baseline, but it has the virtue of being relatively easy to apply in an objective
fashion.

43872-nyu_97-1 Sheet No. 36 Side A

04/20/2022 12:00:09

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\97-1\NYU102.txt

April 2022]

unknown

STRUCTURAL BIASES

Seq: 9

13-APR-22

12:25

67

04/20/2022 12:00:09

30 See infra notes 358–74 and accompanying text (expanding on this point and noting
possible extensions of this project that would focus on political and social blocs outside the
party system).
31 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2385 (2006) (“From nearly the start of the American republic, . . .
[t]he enduring institutional form of democratic political competition has turned out to be
not branches but political parties.”); see also E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY
GOVERNMENT 1 (2004) (observing that “modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of
the parties” and claiming that parties are the “makers of democratic government”); MARK
TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITUTION MATTERS 13 (2011) (“In short, the Constitution
matters because political parties matter, and the Constitution has some influence on the
way parties operate.”).
32 See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077,
1113–16 (2014) (reviewing “an ever-growing body of social science work” on partisanship
as a sociopolitical identity).
33 See infra Section III.A.6.
34 See M ATT G ROSSMANN & D AVID A. H OPKINS , A SYMMETRIC P OLITICS :
IDEOLOGICAL REPUBLICANS AND GROUP INTEREST DEMOCRATS 100–01 (2016)
(discussing the Democratic coalition since the mid-1970s).

43872-nyu_97-1 Sheet No. 36 Side A

alternatives). But this fact only becomes politically meaningful—and
only gives rise to a structural bias in our sense—when veto points bear
on a discrepancy among rival factions. If political party A has an
ambitious legislative agenda whereas political party B prefers statutory inertia, then a proliferation of veto points does not just hinder
lawmaking in the abstract. It takes on new meaning as anti-A and proB, relative to the status quo ante.
Structural biases can advantage or disadvantage political factions
of any sort, including interest groups, demographic groups, and socioeconomic classes.30 In the U.S. system, political parties play an especially central role in determining the salience and significance of
structural biases. Because the two major parties are the key institutions that organize political contestation,31 biases will be most likely to
generate political conflict when they benefit Democrats or
Republicans to the detriment of the other. Moreover, many social
identities are now subsumed into party identities, and many demographic and interest groups are now firmly ensconced in either the
Democratic or Republican coalition.32 As a result, biases against those
groups become biases against one of the parties, and vice versa. The
design of the Senate, for example, harms not only residents of more
populous states but also the Democratic Party, given the prevailing
partisan geography.33 And because the design of the Senate harms
Democrats, by extension it harms every voting bloc that makes up the
party’s base, from labor unions to certain communities of color to
reproductive-rights advocates to environmentalists.34 Both for these
reasons and to keep the scope of the project manageable, this Article
homes in on biases that affect the two major political parties.
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See infra Section IV.C.
See infra notes 73–83 and accompanying text.
37 See IAN F. FERGUSSON & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43491,
TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 22 (2019)
(describing these expedited procedures).
36
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Complicating matters, the parties not only seek to alter or exploit
certain constitutional arrangements at certain junctures but also have
themselves been shaped by such arrangements—meaning that fights
over structural biases take place within a politics that is partially constructed by those biases. We return to this endogeneity issue, as well
as to the issue of biases that empower or disempower different factions within a party, in Part IV.35
Constitutional arrangements do not always intersect neatly with
partisan cleavages. Historically, any number of arrangements have
been accused of contributing to the subordination of racial minority
groups and economically vulnerable Americans in ways that were
taken for granted by the leadership of both parties.36 Today’s federal
lawmaking process might be seen as tilted toward, say, international
trade, and thus toward groups that benefit from such trade, on
account of special procedures that make it easier to pass trade agreements than ordinary laws.37 But if the parties are either mutually
aligned or internally divided on trade policy, then this tilt would not
amount to a structural bias in favor of one party over the other.
As this discussion suggests, the same constitutional arrangement
can be structurally biased in one period but not in a later period, or
vice versa, if external developments change its practical or factional
implications across the periods. The political significance of the
Senate’s overrepresentation of small states, for example, depends on
the geographic distribution of partisans across the nation, which may
fluctuate even if the Senate’s apportionment rules remain constant.
Against the backdrop of a rarely updated constitutional text, identifying the ebb and flow of structural biases is a way to mark the passage of constitutional time.
In introducing and beginning to theorize the idea of structural
biases, this Article does not offer anything remotely like a comprehensive historical or comparative analysis. Nor does it delve into the
details of any single institutional arrangement. Our focus, instead, is
on a high-level overview of the past fifty years or so in U.S. constitutional politics, mostly (though not entirely) at the federal level. The
logic of our account, however, generalizes broadly. The endemic character of structural biases means that they will exist to a greater or
lesser extent in any politically heterogeneous society—which is to say,
almost everywhere. In addition to clarifying the current phase of
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American constitutionalism, we hope to provide tools for thinking
about the role of these biases across constitutional systems.
B. Prior Legal Literature and the Promise of a Structural(-Bias)
Turn
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38 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Why Liberals and Conservatives Flipped on Judicial
Restraint: Judicial Review in the Cycles of Constitutional Time, 98 TEX. L. REV. 215 (2019);
Barry Friedman, The Cycles of Constitutional Theory, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
2004, at 149.
39 See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 496–504.
40 See id. at 504–16. But cf. Mark Tushnet, Politics as Rational Deliberation or Theater:
A Response to “Institutional Flip-Flops,” 94 TEX. L. REV. 82, 83–90 (2016) (noting that
most of Posner and Sunstein’s examples of flip-flopping involve “aggregates,” such as
“Democratic Senators” or “Republican Senators,” rather than individuals).

43872-nyu_97-1 Sheet No. 37 Side A

Our investigation of structural bias has some affinities with two
strains in the U.S. constitutional law literature: one that focuses on the
rotation of power between the parties and another that focuses on the
consistency of constitutional arrangements with democratic values.
We do not disagree with the leading works in either strain, each of
which provides valuable insights into structural constitutional law. But
the concept of structural bias captures important dynamics missed by
these accounts.
The first, descriptive body of work looks at how views on issues
of structural constitutional law vary depending on which party holds
office. The central finding is that views seem to vary quite a lot. When
a party gains control over a government institution, it tends to endorse
expansive understandings of that institution’s authority; losing control
over an institution tends to have the opposite effect. Legal scholars
have explored this dynamic in particular depth for theories of judicial
review.38 A similar sort of cycling, or “flip-flopping,” has characterized the parties’ positions on federalism, the separation of powers, the
Senate filibuster, and more.39
Institutional flip-flopping plainly occurs to some significant
extent, which suggests that political opportunism and motivated reasoning play a significant role in debates over structural constitutional
law.40 But just as plainly, some people’s views on structural questions
do not hinge exclusively, if at all, on the short-term distribution of
partisan power. Nor does this distribution fully determine the political
or practical effects of any given structural arrangement.
Consider, for example, what Richard Briffault calls the “new preemption”: the “emergence and rapid spread of . . . sweeping state laws
that clearly, intentionally, extensively, and at times punitively bar
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41 Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995,
1997 (2018).
42 Id. at 1997–98.
43 See id. at 2009; see also id. at 1999–2002 (cataloging related examples involving gun
control, environmental protection, public health, civil rights, and more); KIM HADDOW,
LOC. SOL. SUPPORT CTR., UNDER THE COVER OF COVID: A SURVEY OF 2020-2021
STATE PREEMPTION TRENDS 4 (2021), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
5ce4377caeb1ce00013a02fd/t/604faee2e641222b084316ff/1615834855353/LSSCUndertheCoverofCovid-March2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/X762-5RBD] (discussing “an
avalanche of legislation” introduced in 2021 “that would further limit local authority” to
address the COVID-19 pandemic and “block local government initiatives to reform police
departments”).
44 ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 15–20 (2d
ed. 2003) (discussing slavery, restrictions on suffrage, modes of selecting presidents and
senators, Senate apportionment, and judicial power).
45 See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
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local efforts to address a host of local problems.”41 An account based
on rotation of power would predict that views about this sort of preemption will flip-flop depending on whether relevant state and local
governments happen to be controlled by Democrats or Republicans at
a given moment. But there is a deeper, longer-term dynamic at play.
The political geography of the contemporary United States has
resulted in many large, Democratic-controlled cities in states with
Republican-controlled state governments. The result, as Briffault documents, is that “the preponderance of new preemption actions and
proposals have been advanced by Republican-dominated state governments, embrace conservative economic and social causes, and
respond to—and are designed to block—relatively progressive local
regulations.”42 Rotation-of-power accounts have little to say about
cases like Alabama’s reliably Republican state government preempting a minimum wage ordinance in the equally reliably
Democratic city of Birmingham.43 A focus on structural bias better
explains the politics of the new preemption by highlighting how, under
prevailing political conditions, state preemption of local law favors
conservative Republican agendas not cyclically or episodically but
systematically.
The second, normative strain of literature that partially overlaps
with our analysis examines the relationship between structural constitutional arrangements and enduring democratic values. In a book
titled How Democratic Is the American Constitution?, Robert Dahl
famously enumerated a number of undemocratic aspects of the original constitutional design.44 More recently, Sanford Levinson has
emerged as the academy’s most forceful critic of the Constitution’s
democratic shortcomings.45 For Levinson, “many structural provisions
of the Constitution . . . place almost insurmountable barriers in the
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way of any acceptable notion of democracy.”46 He shows how all three
branches have significant democratic deficits. The legislative process
impedes majority rule, mainly on account of the Senate; the presidency is determined by the Electoral College, rather than a nationwide vote, and a president who loses popular support cannot be
replaced mid-term on that basis; and federal judges are given life
tenure.47
As vital as it is to identify such democratic deficits, they need not
go hand in hand with structural biases.48 Either can exist without the
other. Levinson’s critique of the president’s fixed term in office, for
example, arguably shines light on a democratic flaw in the U.S. constitutional framework: The people’s representatives cannot end a failed
presidency through a “no-confidence” vote or similar mechanism.49
But this flaw is not a structural bias, at least not in any obvious sense,
as making it easier to remove the president would not clearly help or
hurt any political faction over an extended period of time.50 Whether
or not a system with an easier-to-remove president would be desirable
as a matter of democratic theory, it is hard to conclude that the
existing removal rules are systematically skewed for or against either
party.
Conversely, structural biases can exist without democratic deficits. Consider the line-item veto, which allows a chief executive to
veto a portion of a bill without vetoing the entire bill. A line-item veto
exists in a majority of U.S. states,51 and it briefly existed at the federal
46
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Id. at 6.
Id. at 25–78 (Congress); id. at 79–122 (presidency); id. at 123–40 (courts). For
another prominent call for structural constitutional reform keyed to democratic values, see
AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI., OUR COMMON PURPOSE: REINVENTING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
FOR THE 21 ST C ENTURY (2020), https://amacad.org/sites/default/files/publication/
downloads/2020-Democratic-Citizenship_Our-Common-Purpose_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7HND-N48J].
48 Though they certainly can: The malapportionment of the Senate and the Electoral
College provide the most familiar examples of institutions that are both democratically
suspect and structurally biased. See infra Section III.A.6.
49 See LEVINSON, supra note 45, at 119–21.
50 In the seven decades that Gallup has been measuring presidential approval ratings,
the five presidents whose approval ratings dipped below thirty percent—and thus would
have been ripe for removal if the Constitution contained a no-confidence procedure—
included two Democrats and three Republicans. See Presidential Approval Ratings—
Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/116677/
Presidential-Approval-Ratings-Gallup-Historical-Statistics-Trends.aspx [https://perma.cc/
S9DE-9YXE].
51 See Gubernatorial Veto Authority with Respect to Major Budget Bill(s), NAT’L CONF.
OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 2008), https://ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/gubernatorialveto-authority-with-respect-to-major.aspx [https://perma.cc/MX2D-P2SX].
47
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level before being struck down as unconstitutional.52 The line-item
veto alters the relationship between the political branches. Its introduction transfers legal authority from the legislature to the executive;
its elimination transfers authority in the opposite direction.53 Yet
because neither branch is clearly more or less democratic than the
other,54 any attempt to evaluate the line-item veto in democratic
terms would require a complex and contestable judgment.
Analysis of the line-item veto is easier from the standpoint of
structural bias. Whatever it means for democracy, the line-item veto
gives chief executives “a specific tool for counteracting improvident
funding.”55 The tool is a one-way ratchet. While an executive wielding
a line-item veto can block appropriations that the legislature has
authorized, she cannot force appropriations beyond ceilings set by the
legislature. If line-item veto provisions work as their proponents
intend, they lead to less government spending.56 This policy bias aligns
with a contemporary partisan bias, given the two parties’ different
attitudes toward public spending.57 It is no surprise, then, that when
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52 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (striking down the Line Item
Veto Act of 1996 as a violation of the Presentment Clause).
53 But cf. Neal E. Devins, In Search of the Lost Chord: Reflections on the 1996 Item
Veto Act, 47 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1605, 1629–31 (1997) (arguing that the line-item veto
enables legislators to shift blame for contentious spending decisions to the chief executive).
54 See Blake Emerson, Liberty and Democracy Through the Administrative State: A
Critique of the Roberts Court’s Political Theory, 73 HASTINGS L.J. 371, 402–08 (2022)
(describing competing claims of “legislative democracy” and “executive democracy” in
contemporary U.S. public law). Compare, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration,
114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2335 (2001) (arguing that the president is more likely than
members of Congress to consider “the preferences of the general public, rather than
merely parochial interests”), with Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and
the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1222 (2006) (arguing that “[a]s a collective
institution, Congress is subject to a wider range of pluralist voices and interest groups than
any other political actor (including the president)”).
55 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 526 (2003); see also id. (describing the federal
line-item veto as “affording the President a mechanism to control federal spending”); Item
Veto Constitutional Amendment: Hearing on H.J. Res. 9 Before the Subcomm. on the Const.
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 18 (2000) (statement of Martin Regalia,
Vice President of Economic Policy and Chief Economist, U.S. Chamber of Commerce)
(describing the line-item veto as “a necessary fiscal tool to reign [sic] in excessive
spending”).
56 Interestingly, there is limited evidence for such an effect. See Shanna Rose,
Institutions and Fiscal Sustainability, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 807, 817–19 (2010) (summarizing
empirical research).
57 See Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 915, 961–65 (2018) (reviewing evidence of a partisan divide on
government spending and the size of government); How Republicans and Democrats View
Federal Spending, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 11, 2019), https://pewresearch.org/politics/2019/
04/11/how-republicans-and-democrats-view-federal-spending [https://perma.cc/BP59QKS8] (documenting disparate partisan views on federal spending).
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members of Congress reintroduced a version of the line-item veto in
the 2000s, a large majority of Republicans supported the effort and a
large majority of Democrats opposed it.58 The line-item veto shows
how a structural bias can exist without raising the democratic concerns
that animate much of the normative scholarship on structural constitutional arrangements.
More generally, appeals to abstract, apolitical ideals such as
democracy can shed only so much light on questions of institutional
design. There are many different ways of organizing government that
are plausibly compatible with democracy, not to mention many different ways of conceptualizing democracy itself.59 Often, the strongest
argument against a contentious constitutional arrangement will not be
that it is undemocratic in some sense all could agree on, but rather
that the arrangement makes it harder to achieve certain policy goals.
This charge can be devastating when the disfavored goals are
extremely valuable. It is not, however, a charge that can purport to be
neutral among policy programs or ideological worldviews. A focus on
structural bias provides resources for evaluating many constitutional
arrangements—from separation-of-powers disputes to the federal
budget process to preemption doctrine—about which democratic
theory does not yield a clear verdict.
C. Prior Nonlegal Literature
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58 See H.R. 4890 (109th): Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006, GOVTRACK (June 22,
2006, 6:01 PM), https://govtrack.us/congress/votes/109-2006/h317 [https://perma.cc/JU724DNN] (noting Republican support by a margin of 212 to 15 and Democratic opposition by
a margin of 156 to 35).
59 Cf. David E. Pozen, The Shrinking Constitution of Settlement, 68 DRAKE L. REV.
335, 349 (2020) (“[A]ppeals to ‘democracy’ . . . will not tell us which elements in our
constitutional system deserve to be celebrated and which deserve to be overhauled without
an account of democracy’s purposes, preconditions, and normative priority. Different
conceptions of democracy may point toward different problems and solutions.”). On
competing theories of democracy, see generally ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO
DEMOCRATIC THEORY (3d ed. 2006); DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (1987). In
an important recent article, Nicholas Bagley makes a similar argument about the limited
utility of analyzing administrative law “with reference to broadly shared commitments”
rather than “contested ideological visions.” Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118
MICH. L. REV. 345, 360 (2019).
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Outside of law, our inquiry is most consonant with scholarship in
the fields of comparative political science and political economy
exploring the impacts of various governance arrangements. This literature, which focuses largely on institutional determinants of public
spending and economic redistribution, has identified a number of persistent policy biases. “Majoritarian elections,” for instance, “are associated with a smaller overall size of government, smaller welfare
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spending, and larger budget surpluses . . . than proportional and mixed
systems.”60 Nations that employ proportional representation (PR), on
the other hand, “have developed larger public sectors, more generous
social expenditure, [and] higher levels of redistribution.”61 Presidential systems are associated with less government spending62 and more
economic inequality63 as compared to parliamentary systems. So, too,
“[t]he vast literature on fiscal federalism points to decentralization as
a force that reduces the size of government and the provision of public
goods.”64 Parallel dynamics exist at the local level: Some types of
municipal governments are more conducive to public spending than
others.65 And beyond public spending, the structure of government
has been found to be related to legislative outcomes in areas such as
trade66 and environmental policy.67
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60 T ORSTEN P ERSSON & G UIDO T ABELLINI , T HE E CONOMIC E FFECTS OF
CONSTITUTIONS 105 (2003) (acronyms omitted); see also ALBERTO ALESINA & EDWARD L.
GLAESER, FIGHTING POVERTY IN THE US AND EUROPE: A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE 85
(2004) (“[F]or OECD countries, a measure of proportionality of the electoral system is
highly correlated with the amount of government transfers.”). Mandatory voting laws are
sometimes found to move policy leftward by raising turnout among low-income groups.
See, e.g., Alberto Chong & Mauricio Olivera, Does Compulsory Voting Help Equalize
Incomes?, 20 ECON. & POL. 391 (2008). But see Bertrall L. Ross II, Addressing Inequality
in the Age of Citizens United, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1120, 1188–89 (2018) (reviewing contrary
evidence).
61 JONATHAN RODDEN, WHY CITIES LOSE: THE DEEP ROOTS OF THE URBAN-RURAL
POLITICAL DIVIDE 228 (2019); see also John Carey & Simon Hix, Policy Consequences of
Electoral Rules, in POLITICAL SCIENCE, ELECTORAL RULES, AND DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE 46, 53 (Mala Htun & G. Bingham Powell, Jr. eds., 2013) (discussing
evidence that single-member-district systems “tend to produce lower government
spending, lower public deficits, and less government rent-seeking than PR systems”).
62 See, e.g., PERSSON & TABELLINI, supra note 60, at 107 (tracking government
spending and finding that “parliamentary governments grow about twice as much as
presidential governments in the entire sample period” of 1960 to 1998); cf. Nolan M.
McCarty, Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive Politics, 94 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 117 (2000) (modeling the efficiency and distributional effects of the executive
veto on legislative spending decisions).
63 See, e.g., Richard McManus & F. Gulcin Ozkan, Who Does Better for the Economy?
Presidents Versus Parliamentary Democracies, 176 PUB. CHOICE 361, 379 (2018) (finding
that income inequality is 12% to 24% greater under presidential systems as compared to
parliamentary systems).
64 ALESINA & GLAESER, supra note 60, at 87–88.
65 See, e.g., Stephen Coate & Brian Knight, Government Form and Public Spending:
Theory and Evidence from US Municipalities, 3 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 82 (2011)
(showing that public spending is lower under mayor-council as compared to councilmanager forms of government in U.S. cities).
66 Majoritarian politics is biased toward more protectionist trade policy relative to
proportional systems. See, e.g., Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, A Protectionist
Bias in Majoritarian Politics, 120 Q.J. ECON. 1239 (2005) (modeling the relationship);
Carolyn L. Evans, A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics: An Empirical Investigation,
21 ECON. & POL. 278 (2009) (providing empirical evidence through analysis of tariffs);
Stephanie J. Rickard, A Non-Tariff Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics: Government
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Subsidies and Electoral Institutions, 56 INT’L STUD. Q. 777 (2012) (providing empirical
evidence through analysis of subsidies).
67 See, e.g., RODDEN, supra note 61, at 228 (explaining that PR systems are associated
with “more stringent efforts at environmental protection”); Nathan J. Madden, Green
Means Stop: Veto Players and Their Impact on Climate-Change Policy Outputs, 23 ENV’T
POL. 570 (2014) (finding that higher numbers of “political institutions” in a state are
associated with lower rates of climate policy adoption).
68 Holger Döring & Philip Manow, Is Proportional Representation More Favourable to
the Left? Electoral Rules and Their Impact on Elections, Parliaments and the Formation of
Cabinets, 47 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 149, 149 (2015); see also id. at 149–54 (discussing possible
explanations for this finding); Torben Iversen & David Soskice, Electoral Institutions and
the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others, 100 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 165, 166 (2006) (showing theoretically and empirically “that in a two-party
majoritarian system the center-right party is more likely to win government power, and
redistribute less, than in a multiparty PR system”).
69 See infra notes 121, 292–94 and accompanying text.
70 See infra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.
71 See infra note 296 and accompanying text.
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The effects of institutional arrangements are not limited to policy;
structural choices are also closely linked to electoral outcomes. Crossnationally, “[r]ight-wing governments are more likely to form under
majoritarian rules, whereas left-wing governments are more frequent
with proportional representation.”68 Within the United States, votes
for Republican legislative candidates translate into legislative seats
more readily than do votes for Democrats. This is most apparent in
the Senate, given the political geography of rural America.69 But it
also holds in the House of Representatives and in the overwhelming
majority of state legislatures that use single-member districts, which
manifest a pro-rural (and thus pro-Republican) bias.70 Similarly, the
Electoral College is now widely understood to be tilted against
Democrats. Consistent with recent electoral outcomes, empirical evidence suggests that national-popular-vote losers who win the
Electoral College are far more likely to be Republicans.71
This Article seeks to bring into constitutional scholarship the core
insight of these literatures: Institutions matter to policy and electoral
outcomes. Work in this vein by social scientists has focused on macrolevel questions of government design, such as presidential-versusparliamentary systems or proportional-versus-majoritarian modes of
electing legislatures. This macro-level focus may be necessary to
enable rigorous econometric comparisons across countries. But constitutional orders also have more discrete, idiosyncratic features that do
not lend themselves to cross-national quantitative analysis—and yet
nonetheless may be structurally biased with respect to policy outcomes, electoral outcomes, or both. Such features exist in spades in
the United States, and their biases appear to have become more acute
in recent years. We turn now to this possibility.
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II
STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFLICT

Today’s most significant constitutional fights, as one of us has
described elsewhere,72 increasingly concern not the substance of judicially enforced constitutional rights but rather the structure of constitutional governance. Seemingly settled practices of organizing politics
are becoming unsettled. After first sketching earlier episodes of structural constitutional conflict, this Part investigates its recent revival and
argues that this trend is best explained by the iterated interaction
between structural biases and multiple forms of partisan polarization.
A. A Return to Structural Struggle

04/20/2022 12:00:09

72 See David E. Pozen, Hardball and/as Anti-Hardball, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 949 (2019); Pozen, supra note 59.
73 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at
506–18 (1969) (discussing framers’ arguments to this effect).
74 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 171 (2016).
75 The “Beardian” (or “neo-Beardian”) literature advancing such arguments is vast.
Leading works include CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913); KLARMAN, supra note 74; JENNIFER
NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE
MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY (1990).
76 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 90–91, 255–59,
292–95 (2005) (discussing pro-slavery implications of, inter alia, the Three-Fifths Clause,
the Fugitive Slave Clause, Article V’s limitations on constitutional amendment, and the
slave-importation provisions of Article I, Section 9); GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A
SLAVEHOLDERS’ UNION: SLAVERY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY
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The story of American constitutional politics could be told, in significant part, as a story of struggle over structural bias. From the
Founding to the present, constitutional designers and reformers have
fought to create structural biases that benefit their agendas while
preventing their opponents from doing the same. Large congressional
districts, to take just one example, were preferred by the framers not
only to dilute the influence of “factions” and promote civic-minded
representatives,73 but also to secure the dominance of large property
holders whose resources and connections would put them in the best
position to win geographically dispersed elections.74 Critics then and
ever since have charged that this design feature, among many others,
stacked the deck in favor of private property rights and against economic redistribution.75 Critics have further charged that the original
constitutional framework bolstered chattel slavery through interlocking structural protections for slaveowners, slave states, and the
foreign slave trade.76
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The intensity of such criticism has waxed and waned over time,
but concerns about structural biases have never gone away. Contestation involving race is one particularly persistent through line. Ever
since the Founding, issues of race have explicitly motivated or lurked
just beneath the surface of foundational fights over structural arrangements, from antebellum debates about nullification and admission of
new states;77 to Reconstruction Era debates about voting rights and
the scope of federal power;78 to Civil Rights Era debates about, once
again, voting rights and the scope of federal power;79 to contemporary
debates about, once again, voting rights and admission of new states;80
to recurrent debates about the Electoral College.81 Reflecting on this
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AMERICAN REPUBLIC 9 (2010) (arguing that the original Constitution distributed political
power between North and South in ways that “materially advanced the creation of a
slaveholders’ union” and “laid the groundwork for expansion of the slave state economies
and of slavery itself”). Vigorous debates continue to this day over whether and to what
extent the original constitutional design was “pro-slavery.” See, e.g., Nicholas Guyatt, How
Proslavery Was the Constitution?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June 6, 2019), https://nybooks.com/
articles/2019/06/06/how-proslavery-was-the-constitution [https://perma.cc/7HMX-6GG5]
(reviewing SEAN WILENTZ, NO PROPERTY IN MAN: SLAVERY AND ANTISLAVERY AT THE
NATION’S FOUNDING (2018)).
77 The nullification crisis was formally about whether a state may ignore a federal law
that the state legislature deems contrary to the U.S. Constitution, but it was closely linked
to fights over slavery as well as tariff policy. See EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DURING THE GREAT REBELLION 409 (4th
ed. 1882) (quoting a letter by Andrew Jackson stating that “the tariff was only a pretext,
and disunion and a southern confederacy the real object”); David P. Currie, The
Constitution in Congress: The Public Lands, 1829–1861, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 783, 785 (2003)
(noting that John C. Calhoun “maintained that the great Nullification crisis of 1832–33 was
really about slavery”). See generally RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE UNION AT RISK: JACKSONIAN
DEMOCRACY, STATES’ RIGHTS, AND THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS (1987). As the nation
expanded westward, every possible admission of a new state risked upsetting the balance
of free and slave states, leading states to be admitted in pairs—one slave and one free—for
much of the antebellum period. But cf. Paul Finkelman, The Cost of Compromise and the
Covenant with Death, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 845, 863–67 (2011) (discussing complications with
this narrative).
78 See generally ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE CONSTITUTION (2019) (analyzing the Reconstruction
Amendments as a “second founding”).
79 See generally 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION (2014) (arguing that the civil rights revolution of the 1960s effected a
fundamental transformation of the constitutional order).
80 See Paul Frymer, The Politics of D.C. Statehood Follow a Well-Worn Path. Here’s
Why., WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (July 6, 2020), https://washingtonpost.com/politics/
2020/07/06/politics-dc-statehood-follow-well-worn-path-heres-why [https://perma.cc/C6YTRFF8] (placing current debates over the status of the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico
in the context of a “long historical pattern” of racism and racial conflict underlying
statehood disputes).
81 See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, WHY DO WE STILL HAVE THE ELECTORAL
COLLEGE? (2020) (tracing the history of the Electoral College and attributing its
persistence, in part, to successful efforts by Southern states to block reforms as a means of
preserving white supremacy).
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pattern, a noted scholar asserted in 1964 that “if in the United States
one disapproves of racism, one should disapprove of federalism.”82
The fact that the term “states’ rights” still functions as a racial dog
whistle shows the lasting power of structural biases to shape constitutional politics.83
In light of this history, late twentieth-century debates over structural bias seem tame. The few serious legislative attempts at structural
reform were unsuccessful, as with the line-item veto84 and right-wing
pushes in the 1990s for a balanced budget amendment and term limits
for members of Congress.85 The Rehnquist Court issued several highprofile decisions appearing to rein in congressional power86 but failed,
in the view of most, to transform the federal-state balance.87 The
Article V amendment process fell into disuse.88 Constitution worship
prevailed in public discourse,89 along with a corresponding quietism
about constitutional institutions.90 By the early 2000s, scholars who
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82 WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 155 (1964).
By the late twentieth century, Riker came to view federalism as finally decoupled from its
racially inflected roots. See John Dinan, Relations Between State and National
Governments, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 7, 18–19
(Donald P. Haider-Markel ed., 2014).
83 See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS
HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 16–17 (2014) (discussing
the legacy of George Wallace’s efforts to defend white supremacy in a “language of statefederal relations”); TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY,
IMPLICIT MESSAGES, AND THE NORM OF EQUALITY 72–81 (2001) (describing “states’
rights” rhetoric as part of a post-1950s shift from explicit to implicit racial appeals).
84 See supra notes 51–58 and accompanying text.
85 See Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment?: Lopez and Constitutional
Theory, 46 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 845, 849–50 (1996) (discussing these efforts as part of
“a series of proposals aimed at reducing the national government’s scope” in congressional
Republicans’ “Contract with America”).
86 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995).
87 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 997, 1006 (2015) (“[T]he Rehnquist Court’s federalism revolution has
been a failure. Despite many skirmishes and some genuine defeats . . . the traditional
nationalists are winning the war over constraints on federal power.”); see also David
Fontana, The Current Generation of Constitutional Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 1061, 1068 n.55
(2005) (book review) (collecting sources taking this view).
88 The only formal constitutional amendment since 1971, on congressional
compensation, is widely seen as “fluky” and having “no significant effect.” David A.
Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1486–87
(2001).
89 See generally AZIZ RANA, THE CONSTITUTIONAL BIND: HOW EMPIRE SHAPED AN
AMERICAN ROMANCE (forthcoming 2023) (charting the twentieth-century rise of
constitutional veneration and its consolidation in the late 1970s and early 1980s).
90 Sandy Levinson has documented and lamented such quietism in numerous works,
perhaps most poignantly in Sanford Levinson, How I Lost My Constitutional Faith, 71 MD.
L. REV. 956 (2012).
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had detected the possible emergence of a new constitutional order following the presidential election of Ronald Reagan came to emphasize
the era’s “chastened” constitutional ambitions and how little change
occurred in any of the branches.91 The rules of the political game
remained relatively stable.
Recent years, however, have witnessed a resurgence of conflict
over structural constitutional arrangements. This is true even if one
brackets President Trump’s behaviors during his four years in the
White House as anomalous in their degree of disregard for constitutional norms.92 On the political right, for instance, opposition to the
authority and independence of the administrative state persisted
during President Trump’s term of office and continues to mount;93
support for the Voting Rights Act has evaporated;94 and opposition to
undocumented immigration has led to repeated efforts to change the
census and, with it, congressional representation.95 On the political
left, a growing chorus of voices has called for eliminating the filibuster
for legislation, transferring authority to draw legislative districts from
state legislatures to independent commissions, reforming the Supreme
Court, reconfiguring or circumventing the Electoral College, and
91

See generally MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003).
See Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 65
UCLA L. REV. 1430, 1450–56 (2018) (listing examples).
93 See generally Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s
Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8–51 (2017)
(describing conservative attacks on the administrative state by contemporary executive
branch officials, judges, and academics).
94 In 2006, the Voting Rights Act reauthorization was passed overwhelmingly in the
House, passed unanimously in the Senate, and signed by a Republican President. Fannie
Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and
Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577. Less than two decades later,
Republican appointees on the Court have invalidated a key part of the Act, see Shelby
Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), federal voting rights statutes no longer command
bipartisan support, see, e.g., Carl Hulse, Republicans Block a Second Voting Rights Bill in
the Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/03/us/politics/
senate-republicans-voting-rights-act.html [https://perma.cc/AA36-E4GA], and red state
legislatures have taken to enacting new restrictions on ballot access, see Voting Laws
Roundup: October 2021, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 4, 2021), https://
www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-october-2021
[https://perma.cc/S5GN-RTEK].
95 The Trump Administration tried unsuccessfully to add a citizenship question to the
2020 census and to generate census data that would enable the exclusion of undocumented
immigrants from congressional apportionment. See Tierney Sneed, Trump Admin Pulls the
Plug on Hail Mary Anti-Immigrant Census Gambit, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Jan. 13, 2021,
10:53 AM), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/census-bureau-apportionmentimmigrant-project-ceased [https://perma.cc/7K2D-V5HL]; Michael Wines, 2020 Census
Won’t Have Citizenship Question as Trump Administration Drops Effort, N.Y. TIMES (July
2, 2019), https://nytimes.com/2019/07/02/us/trump-census-citizenship-question.html [https://
perma.cc/K6HU-5FS9].
92
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admitting new states into the Union.96 In Congress, the White House,
and state capitals, Democratic and Republican officeholders have
been engaging in new forms of constitutional hardball.97 Across area
after area, “previously taken-for-granted constitutional institutions
and distributions are increasingly subject to revision” either formally
or informally,98 not for the most part through bargaining and compromise so much as through the unilateral initiative of one side.
Why?
B. Ideological, Geographic, and Demographic Polarization

04/20/2022 12:00:09

96 See Pozen, supra note 59, at 338–45 (cataloging these and other examples of “ways in
which the Constitution of Settlement is becoming unsettled”).
97 See generally Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 57 (exploring possible drivers of escalating
constitutional hardball, especially but not only on the Republican side, since the mid1990s).
98 Pozen, supra note 59, at 350.
99 Many different works have discussed the arguable electoral or policy biases (not
necessarily by that label) of individual constitutional arrangements, with reference to
recent conflicts over them. We are not aware of any prior work that explores the
relationship between such biases and such conflicts at a wholesale rather than a retail level.
100 Cf. infra notes 363–74 and accompanying text (discussing cultural and material
variables that our account largely brackets).
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The answer, in a word, is polarization. More specifically, several
overlapping forms of polarization have worked together to make
more and more features of structural constitutional law more and
more biased against one or the other major political party. Recognizing that these features systematically tilt the playing field against
their electoral prospects or policy goals, those who are harmed by
structural biases are fighting back. Moreover, at the same time that
polarization is exacerbating structural biases, the inverse seems to be
happening as well.
It will surprise no one that partisan polarization has something to
do with constitutional conflict. Yet the connections between the two
still have not been fully mapped and, in particular, the key role of
structural biases in motivating and predicting constitutional conflict
has not been explored.99 Our account of the dialectical interaction
between partisan polarization and structural bias does not capture all
relevant variables of course,100 but it supplies a parsimonious, unified
framework for understanding the renewed interest in constitutional
governance.
First, Democrats’ and Republicans’ ideological polarization
increases the expected frequency and intensity of partisan conflict
over structural arrangements. It is by now familiar that the
Democratic Party has moved significantly to the left and the
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Republican Party significantly to the right over the past halfcentury.101 This pattern is generally understood to be asymmetric,
with Republicans having tacked further rightward than Democrats
have leftward.102 Earlier in the twentieth century, the parties’ platforms overlapped to a greater degree, so much so that a 1950 report
by a task force of the American Political Science Association
described the central problem of our party system as one of insufficient polarization.103 Political scientists debate the sources of the
growing divide between the parties since the 1970s. Some emphasize
ways in which mass public opinion has polarized,104 while others stress
the extent to which liberals have sorted into the Democratic camp and
conservatives into the Republican camp.105 Whatever its ultimate
causes, ideological polarization is an unmistakable feature of contemporary U.S. politics, and “the parties are now chiefly distinguished
from each other by their contrasting agendas and worldviews.”106
Ideological polarization shapes politics on many levels, one of
which is that it makes structural biases both more likely to emerge and
more potent when they exist. The basic reason is simple. Ideological
polarization means that whenever a structural constitutional arrangement systematically favors one sort of policy outcome over another, it
will be more likely to favor one political party over the other for that
very reason. As the parties have developed increasingly differentiated
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101 Important works documenting this trend include NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T.
POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND
UNEQUAL RICHES (2d ed. 2016); POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS
(Daniel J. Hopkins & John Sides eds., 2015); SAM ROSENFELD, THE POLARIZERS:
POSTWAR ARCHITECTS OF OUR PARTISAN ERA (2018); BARBARA SINCLAIR, PARTY
WARS: POLARIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL POLICY MAKING (2006).
102 See Nolan McCarty, What We Know and Do Not Know About Our Polarized Politics
(noting a “major partisan asymmetry in polarization,” with “movement of the Republican
Party to the right account[ing] for most of the divergence between the two parties”), in
POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 101, at 1, 3.
103 See Comm. on Pol. Parties, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report
of the Committee on Political Parties, 44 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 3–4 (Supp. 1950)
(“Alternatives between the parties are defined so badly that it is often difficult to
determine what the election has decided even in broadest terms.”). Similar dynamics held
in certain earlier periods. In the decades leading up to the Civil War, for instance, the
major parties were not neatly polarized even on issues as fundamental as slavery. See
DESMOND S. KING & ROGERS M. SMITH, STILL A HOUSE DIVIDED: RACE AND POLITICS IN
OBAMA’S AMERICA 38–42 (2011) (describing cross-party coalitions in support of and in
opposition to slavery during the antebellum period).
104 See, e.g., ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE GREAT ALIGNMENT: RACE, PARTY
TRANSFORMATION, AND THE RISE OF DONALD TRUMP 2 (2018).
105 See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, UNSTABLE MAJORITIES: POLARIZATION, PARTY
SORTING, AND POLITICAL STALEMATE, at xv (2017).
106 ROSENFELD, supra note 101, at 3; see also id. (“The parties’ increasing internal
cohesion makes them more disciplined and oppositional, and the forces of ideological zeal
and partisan team spirit now reinforce each other.”).
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policy programs, the space for “neutral” institutional design has narrowed. Rising levels of intraparty cohesion and unity, meanwhile,
make it easier for partisans to organize against arrangements that
thwart their goals.107
As we detail in the next Part, contemporary Democratic officeholders are more likely than their Republican counterparts to seek to
enact policy changes through nontax legislation and regulation.108
Structural barriers to enacting and administering ambitious new laws
have, in consequence, assumed an increasingly anti-Democratic
valence. Prominent voices in the Democratic coalition have called for
weakening some of these barriers, as by eliminating the Senate filibuster109 or curtailing judicial review.110 On the flip side, Republicans
who recognize that Democrats need powerful agencies to pursue
ambitious regulatory agendas with aging statutes have turned against
agency power. This turn is reflected in executive branch efforts to
weaken the capacity of the bureaucracy,111 along with judicial efforts
to revitalize the nondelegation doctrine112 and to limit or repudiate
Chevron deference.113
These conflicts over structural constitutional law not only follow
from but also help fuel polarization. The growing perception that a
certain constitutional arrangement is systematically biased against one
side generates new forms of argument and activism by that side’s sup-
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107 The party coalitions are not now, nor have they ever been, ideological monoliths. But
when agreement about distinct policy goals exists within each coalition at some (perhaps
high) level of generality, partisans will generally be able to identify and unify in support of
structural arrangements that advance their goals and against arrangements that stand in
the way.
108 See infra Sections III.A.1–2.
109 See Ronald Brownstein, The End of the Filibuster—No, Really, ATLANTIC (July 30,
2020, 2:45 PM), https://theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/07/why-senate-filibuster-couldbe-gone-2021/614278 [https://perma.cc/5KPR-RM6F] (discussing support among many
Democrats for eliminating the filibuster).
110 See, e.g., Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, Democratizing the Supreme Court, 109
CALIF. L. REV. 1703 (2021) (reviewing recent Court-reform proposals offered by
progressives and arguing in favor of approaches that would limit the Court’s power).
111 For a detailed account of such efforts in recent Republican administrations, see Jody
Freeman & Sharon Jacobs, Structural Deregulation, 135 HARV. L. REV. 585 (2021)
(discussing initiatives related to agency staffing, resource allocation, expert capacity,
independent oversight, workflow, and reputation).
112 See Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 279 (2021) (explaining that “[f]or the first time in modern history, a
working majority on the Supreme Court”—composed entirely of Republican appointees—
“may be poised to give the nondelegation doctrine real teeth”).
113 See Gregory A. Elinson & Jonathan S. Gould, The Politics of Deference, 75 VAND. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3889828 [https://perma.cc/2RU5BM26] (tracing the evolution of the politics of Chevron deference over the past four
decades).
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114 See Metzger, supra note 93, at 2–46 (describing the rise of conservative “antiadministrativism” in the courts, Congress, the executive branch, and the academy). In an
amusing but telling episode, after Justice Neil Gorsuch embraced the “antiadministrativist” label in a Federalist Society speech, a conservative nonprofit began to
manufacture and sell coffee mugs with that label. See Christopher J. Walker, Sunstein &
Vermeule on Administrative Law’s Morality (and 2017 AdLaw Year in Review), YALE J.
ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Dec. 29, 2017), https://yalejreg.com/nc/sunstein-vermeuleon-administrative-laws-morality-and-2017-adlaw-year-in-review [https://perma.cc/ZQE858E8].
115 For mainstream media discussions of this phenomenon, see Neil Gross, Why Do the
Democrats Keep Saying “Structural”?, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2019), https://nytimes.com/
2019/07/31/opinion/2020-democrats-change-structural.html [https://perma.cc/7GEDBW8Q]; Carl Hulse, Countering G.O.P. on Courts, Democrats Will Call for “Structural”
Change, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2020), https://nytimes.com/2020/07/31/us/democratsjudiciary-reform.html [https://perma.cc/VJ2Y-WKTB].
116 See, e.g., MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 101, at 3–4.
117 See infra Sections III.A.1–3.
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porters, which in turn generates countermoves by opponents, in a
manner that can exacerbate confirmation bias and deepen preexisting
divides. Skepticism toward the administrative state and the constitutional norms that protect its independence, for example, has become a
constitutive commitment for many Republican legal elites—one that
helps define their social identity in contradistinction to the proregulatory posture of Democratic elites.114 Among Democrats, calls for
“structural change” have become shibboleths that help distinguish the
party’s left from its center.115 To some unmeasurable but potentially
significant extent, structural biases and ideological polarization reinforce each other through the grievances and cleavages they engender.
Biased features of the constitutional order may contribute to ideological polarization in more discrete ways as well. Some political
scientists have argued, for instance, that economic inequality and
polarization are mutually reinforcing.116 As the next Part explains, a
raft of veto points in the federal lawmaking process can be seen as
tilting that process against redistributive agendas.117 Insofar as economic inequality tends to foster social and political division and hardwired features of the constitutional system tend to insulate such inequality from policy response, those features serve to perpetuate polarization. A structurally biased lawmaking process, economic inequality,
and ideological polarization, on this account, feed one another in a
vicious circle.
Second, geographic polarization can similarly generate and exacerbate structural biases. As with ideological polarization, it is familiar
that Democrats and Republicans are now geographically polarized.
“While the two major parties once fiercely battled each other for popular supremacy across wide swaths of the continent, Republicans and
Democrats today both maintain sizable regional bastions” of sup-
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port.118 Geographic polarization is evidenced across states, many of
which are reliably “red” or “blue” in presidential elections. Within
states, Democrats are electorally dominant in urban cores and competitive in inner-ring suburbs, while Republicans win in exurban and
rural areas.119 This sort of geographic polarization was not the norm
for much of the twentieth century,120 but its existence in contemporary politics is undeniable.
Geographic polarization of the electorate gives rise to structural
biases throughout the constitutional order. The most obvious examples are institutions such as the Senate and the Electoral College that
inflate the power of less populated states relative to a populationbased apportionment scheme. These institutions currently manifest a
significant pro-Republican bias, in virtue of Republican electoral
dominance in such states.121 Because of the president’s and Senate’s
role in selecting and confirming Supreme Court Justices and other
officials, this bias ramifies throughout the federal government. Justice
Brett Kavanaugh, for instance, was confirmed on a nearly party-line
vote of senators representing only forty-four percent of the U.S. population—a historic low.122
Less obviously, single-member, plurality-winner congressional
districts also hurt contemporary Democrats. Such districts are not
required by the text of the Constitution, but they have been mandated

43872-nyu_97-1 Sheet No. 44 Side B
04/20/2022 12:00:09

118 DAVID A. HOPKINS, RED FIGHTING BLUE: HOW GEOGRAPHY AND ELECTORAL
RULES POLARIZE AMERICAN POLITICS 3 (2017).
119 RODDEN, supra note 61, at 106; cf. Ganesh Sitaraman, Morgan Ricks & Christopher
Serkin, Regulation and the Geography of Inequality, 70 DUKE L.J. 1763 (2021) (discussing
the concomitant rise of geography-based economic inequality).
120 See, e.g., RODDEN, supra note 61, at 4 (noting no correlation between a county’s
population density and Democratic Party vote share in the 1916 presidential election, some
correlation in the 1960 presidential election, and an “astounding” correlation in the 2016
presidential election).
121 See, e.g., ADAM JENTLESON, KILL SWITCH: THE RISE OF THE MODERN SENATE AND
THE CRIPPLING OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 10 (2021) (noting that “Senate Democrats
have represented a majority of the American population at every moment in the twentyfirst century so far, regardless of whether they controlled the majority of the seats in the
Senate”).
122 Joshua Tauberer, With Kavanaugh Vote, the Senate Reaches a Historic Low in
Democratic Metric, GOVTRACK.US (Oct. 7, 2018), https://govtrackinsider.com/withkavanaugh-vote-the-senate-reaches-a-historic-low-in-democratic-metric-dfb0f5fa7fa
[https://perma.cc/NSV4-VRK5]; see also Joshua P. Zoffer & David Singh Grewal, The
Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty of a Minoritarian Judiciary, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 437,
454–58 (2020) (documenting the dramatic rise in “minoritarian judges” appointed by
Republican presidents who failed to win the national popular vote, confirmed by
Republican Senate majorities representing less than half of the national population, or
both).
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by statute at the federal level since 1842.123 The overwhelming
majority of state legislators are likewise elected in single-member districts.124 Jonathan Rodden has documented the ways in which this districting arrangement has come to favor Republicans over Democrats,
given the latter’s concentration in urban areas. He provides a wealth
of empirical evidence that “when winner-take-all districts are drawn
on top of this geography, Democrats end up with a distribution of
support across districts that is highly inefficient” because “they win by
excessive margins in the districts they win and fall short by relatively
narrow margins in the districts they lose.”125
The result, Rodden concludes, is that “in the early twenty-first
century, the Democratic Party has a political geography problem.”126
This problem is itself a function of a political institutions problem: The
geographic distribution of partisans matters not for any a priori
reason, but because of its intersection with the design of electoral
structures.127 Recent political science research suggests that the current geographic distribution of partisans may, in addition, create
asymmetric opportunities for Republicans to use anti-democratic tactics in the areas of gerrymandering and voter suppression.128
Beyond the electoral sphere, various legal tools and policy
choices have partisan valences that they would not have had in a less
geographically polarized environment. For instance, as noted
above,129 a new wave of state preemption laws that “clearly, intentionally, extensively, and at times punitively bar local efforts to address a
host of local problems” is closely linked to “the interacting polariza43872-nyu_97-1 Sheet No. 45 Side A
04/20/2022 12:00:09

123 Act of June 25, 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 2c); cf.
Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Democracy and Dysfunction: An Exchange, 50 IND.
L. REV. 281, 304 (2016) (describing “the requirement of single-member [House] districts”
as a “constitutionalized statute[]”).
124 See State Legislative Chambers That Use Multi-Member Districts, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/State_legislative_chambers_that_use_multi-member_districts
[https://perma.cc/583X-2JVY] (“Of the 7,383 seats in the 50 state legislatures, 1,015 are
elected from districts with more than one member, a total of 13.7%.”).
125 RODDEN, supra note 61, at 133; see also Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden,
Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8
Q.J. POL. SCI. 239, 239 (2013) (“We show that in many states, Democrats are inefficiently
concentrated in large cities and smaller industrial agglomerations such that they can expect
to win fewer than 50% of the seats when they win 50% of the votes.”).
126 RODDEN, supra note 61, at 188.
127 Cf. id. at 230 (“In highly proportional systems with large districts, like those in
Northern Europe, the geography of a party’s support is largely irrelevant for the
transformation of votes into seats.”).
128 See Gretchen Helmke, Mary Kroeger & Jack Paine, Democracy by Deterrence:
Norms, Constitutions, and Electoral Tilting, AM. J. POL. SCI. (forthcoming), https://
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12668 [https://perma.cc/RN2B-FRUJ].
129 See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
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tions of Republican and Democrat, conservative and liberal, and
nonurban and urban.”130 The widespread practice of “prison gerrymandering”—counting incarcerated individuals at their places of confinement instead of their home addresses for purposes of the
census131—advantages Republicans by inflating representation of the
rural conservative areas where prisons tend to be located.132 The
organization of most district attorney elections at the level of counties,
rather than cities, gives whiter and more conservative suburbanites a
larger say in criminal justice policies that primarily affect the lives of
racial minorities in urban locales.133
Third, demographic polarization can support structural bias as
well. Throughout U.S. history, contestation over the right to vote and
legal regulation of voting has been closely tied to the parties’ quests
for electoral supremacy.134 If voters’ ascriptive characteristics make it
increasingly easy to predict which party they will support, the parties
will find it increasingly easy to draw ostensibly nonpartisan districts or
to fashion ostensibly nonpartisan ballot-access rules in ways that
afford a partisan edge. Once in place, moreover, such arrangements
may strengthen partisan identities and solidarities through the voting
patterns and grievances they generate—as suggested, for example, by
Republican politicians’ complaints about voter fraud135 and
Democratic politicians’ calls to combat voter suppression.136
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130 Briffault, supra note 41, at 1997; see also Joshua S. Sellers & Erin A. Scharff,
Preempting Politics: State Power and Local Democracy, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1364 (2020)
(explaining that Republican-led “structural preemption,” whereby states displace not just
local governments’ specific policies but their “structural authority” to design institutions,
has also been on the rise).
131 For overviews of prison gerrymandering and its consequences, see Dale E. Ho,
Captive Constituents: Prison-Based Gerrymandering and the Current Redistricting Cycle, 22
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 355 (2011); Michael Skocpol, Note, The Emerging Constitutional
Law of Prison Gerrymandering, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1473 (2017).
132 See Ho, supra note 131, at 360 (“[T]he distortion of the redistricting process [by
prison gerrymandering] . . . has specific and identifiable effects, transferring political power
from certain types of communities—namely, urban districts and communities of color—to
others—generally rural and predominantly white areas.”).
133 See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7, 35–36,
191–95 (2011).
134 See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED
HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 2009) (emphasizing this link
with examples from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries).
135 See, e.g., Kirby Goidel, Keith Gaddie & Spencer Goidel, Rigged-Election Rhetoric:
Coverage and Consequences, 52 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 229 (2019) (finding based on survey
data that Donald Trump’s “rigged-election” claims during the 2016 presidential election
mobilized Republican and Independent voters).
136 See, e.g., Nicholas A. Valentino & Fabian G. Neuner, Why the Sky Didn’t Fall:
Mobilizing Anger in Reaction to Voter ID Laws, 38 POL. PSYCH. 331 (2017) (providing
observational and experimental evidence that “strong emotional reactions to the public

43872-nyu_97-1 Sheet No. 46 Side A

04/20/2022 12:00:09

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\97-1\NYU102.txt

April 2022]

unknown

STRUCTURAL BIASES

Seq: 29

13-APR-22

12:25

87

Structural biases, in other words, can have not only first-order effects
on electoral outcomes but also second-order effects on partisan
mobilization.
The demographic divides between the parties today are stark
along the lines of race, age, gender, and education. The most notable
divide is racial. Simply put, white voters favor Republicans decisively,
and nonwhite voters favor Democrats even more decisively. In presidential elections since 2008, Republican candidates have won white
voters by margins of 12% to 20%, while Democratic candidates have
won Black voters by margins of 81% to 91%, Hispanic voters by margins of 36% to 44%, and Asian American voters by margins of 27% to
47%.137 In recent decades, a parallel gap has opened up between
increasingly Democratic-leaning younger voters and Republicanleaning senior citizens138 and between increasingly Democraticleaning women and Republican-leaning men.139 The contemporary
partisan gap with respect to education is especially striking—highly
educated voters now tend to support Democrats and less educated
voters to support Republicans—in that it represents an inversion of
dynamics that prevailed as recently as the early 2000s.140
These demographic divides set the stage for much of what
Richard Hasen has described as the “voting wars” of the early twentyfirst century.141 The key point, again, is that when many demographic
groups predictably favor one party by wide margins, the parties can
seek to change many electoral rules to their advantage. Of greatest
consequence, Republican-controlled state governments have enacted
a host of restrictions on ballot access that limit the vote of core
43872-nyu_97-1 Sheet No. 46 Side A
04/20/2022 12:00:09

debate about [voter suppression] laws may mobilize Democrats,” thereby partially
offsetting the suppressive effects of these laws).
137 WILLIAM H. FREY, DIVERSITY EXPLOSION: HOW NEW RACIAL DEMOGRAPHICS ARE
REMAKING AMERICA 222 fig.11-3 (rev. & updated ed. 2018).
138 See, e.g., STELLA M. ROUSE & ASHLEY D. ROSS, THE POLITICS OF MILLENNIALS:
POLITICAL BELIEFS AND POLICY PREFERENCES OF AMERICA’S MOST DIVERSE
GENERATION 16 (2018) (explaining that Millennials voted for Democratic candidates at a
higher rate than did older adults in the 2008, 2012, and 2016 elections).
139 See, e.g., Elizabeth U. Cascio & Na’ama Shenhav, A Century of the American
Woman Voter: Sex Gaps in Political Participation, Preferences, and Partisanship Since
Women’s Enfranchisement, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2020, at 24, 35 (“Following the 2016
election, women were almost 12 percentage points more likely than men to consider
themselves Democrats, compared to a sex gap hovering around zero in the late 1940s and
1950s.”).
140 See PEW RSCH. CTR., WIDE GENDER GAP, GROWING EDUCATIONAL DIVIDE IN
VOTERS’ PARTY IDENTIFICATION 26–27 (2018), https://pewresearch.org/politics/wpcontent/uploads/sites/4/2018/03/03-20-18-Party-Identification-CORRECTED.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3CXT-4DEB].
141 See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT
ELECTION MELTDOWN (2012).
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Democratic constituencies, most notably people of color.142 The
mirror image of these efforts are Democratic efforts to reenfranchise
felons143 and provide for automatic voter registration.144 “When party
and race coincide,” as Hasen notes, “it is much harder to separate
racial and partisan intent and effect” in evaluating electoral
arrangements.145
Predictable differences in how various demographic groups vote
also help explain otherwise curious features of voter-identification
laws, such as a Republican-sponsored measure in Texas that did not
recognize university-issued ID cards.146 While turnout-reducing tactics
are manifestly more common and intensive among Republicans,147
Democrats have sometimes used limited versions. State Democratic
parties, for example, benefit from off-cycle school board elections that
preserve the influence of teachers’ unions over those elections.148
In addition, greater overlap between demography and partisanship creates greater potential for political bias in methods for conducting the census. Democrats have long advocated for use of
statistical sampling in the census to remedy the undercount of poorer
and minority voters, which would inflate Democratic representation,
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142 See TOVA ANDREA WANG, THE POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION: DEFENDING AND
EXPANDING AMERICANS’ RIGHT TO VOTE, at xiv (2012) (“[C]ontemporary Republicans
have made it a central part of their election strategy to enact laws and call for practices that
will reduce turnout among those who tend to vote Democratic . . . .”). See generally
SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION
(2006); VOTER SUPPRESSION IN U.S. ELECTIONS (Jim Downs ed., 2020).
143 See Daniel Nichanian, The Voting Rights Manifesto: A State-by-State Plan to Defend
Democracy, VOX (Dec. 15, 2016, 8:50 AM), https://vox.com/the-big-idea/2016/12/15/
13957714/voting-rights-states-ballot-franchise-civil-rights [https://perma.cc/7MWT-DYUU]
(describing reenfranchisement efforts in several states with Democratic governors).
144 See KEVIN MORRIS & PETER DUNPHY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., AVR IMPACT ON
STATE VOTER REGISTRATION (2019), https://brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/
Report_AVR_Impact_State_Voter_Registration.pdf [https://perma.cc/E698-7ZDX]
(reviewing recent automatic-voter-registration reforms).
145 Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party? How Courts Should Think About Republican
Efforts to Make It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F.
58, 61 (2014). By the same token, longstanding electoral arrangements designed to protect
against racial discrimination may assume a new partisan valence. See, e.g., id. (“The Voting
Rights Act, when passed, was not seen as a law that helped the Democratic Party—quite
the opposite. But today, many Republicans view the Voting Rights Act as a law that favors
Democrats . . . .”).
146 See Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 632–33, 641 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (describing, and
enjoining, this measure).
147 See Michael J. Klarman, The Supreme Court, 2019 Term—Foreword: The
Degradation of American Democracy—and the Court, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1, 45–66 (2020).
148 See SARAH F. ANZIA, TIMING AND TURNOUT: HOW OFF-CYCLE ELECTIONS FAVOR
ORGANIZED GROUPS 118–19 (2014).
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while Republicans have pushed back.149 More recently, Republicans
sought to add a question on citizenship to the census, an effort that
would have depressed Hispanic response rates150 and thereby
advantaged the Republican Party. Partisan contestation over the
design and administration of the census makes sense when
demographics and partisanship are tightly aligned.
C. Close Competition
On top of all these trends, the close competition between today’s
parties fuels constitutional conflict. Sharply contested presidential
elections have replaced the landslides of prior generations, while the
contemporary House and Senate have changed hands with greater frequency than at any point since the late nineteenth century.151 As
Frances Lee has detailed, this electoral instability affects the behavior
of officeholders on numerous levels. “Members of insecure parties
worry more about partisan advantage and work harder to win it” than
members of more dominant or more hopeless parties.152 Under
closely divided electoral conditions, officeholders feel a greater need
to “define and dramatize party differences in order to energize their
supporters and to persuade undecided voters to prefer their party to
the opposition,” a dynamic that “stands in tension with successful legislating” for the general good.153
This dynamic extends to structural constitutional arrangements.
Intense competition between the parties encourages the seeking of
any possible advantage, including the use of structural biases for purposes of entrenching one’s own reforms or disrupting the other side’s
43872-nyu_97-1 Sheet No. 47 Side A
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149 See, e.g., Thomas L. Brunell, Using Statistical Sampling to Estimate the U.S.
Population: The Methodological and Political Debate over Census 2000, 33 PS: POL. SCI. &
POL. 775, 776 (2000) (“A principal concern of the Republicans is that Democrats will gain
seats if statistical methods are used to adjust the census counts to include more minorities,
urban residents, and poor people and justify the creation of more electoral districts with a
majority of likely Democratic voters.”).
150 See MATTHEW A. BAUM, BRYCE J. DIETRICH, REBECCA GOLDSTEIN & MAYA SEN,
SHORENSTEIN CTR. ON MEDIA, POL. & PUB. POL’Y, ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF ASKING
ABOUT CITIZENSHIP ON THE U.S. CENSUS: RESULTS FROM A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED
TRIAL 9 (2019), https://shorensteincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CensusCitizenship-March-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5EZ-FX9X] (estimating based on survey
data that inclusion of the citizenship question would have reduced the number of Hispanics
reported in the 2020 census by over twelve percent of the Hispanic population).
151 See FIORINA, supra note 105, at 10 (noting that from 1992 to 2014, “twelve elections
. . . produced six different patterns of majority control of our three national elective
institutions”—the highest level of “majoritarian instability” since the nineteenth century);
FRANCES E. LEE, INSECURE MAJORITIES: CONGRESS AND THE PERPETUAL CAMPAIGN 1–2
(2016) (describing greater stability in past periods of U.S. history).
152 LEE, supra note 151, at 4.
153 See id. at 69–70.

43872-nyu_97-1 Sheet No. 47 Side B

04/20/2022 12:00:09

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\97-1\NYU102.txt

90

unknown

Seq: 32

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

13-APR-22

12:25

[Vol. 97:59

III
MAPPING STRUCTURAL BIASES

154
155
156

See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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Having shown how partisan polarization leads a growing number
of structural constitutional arrangements to cut against one political
party or the other in their electoral or policy effects, we can now build
a fuller catalog of such biases. The previous Parts discussed numerous
examples in passing. This Part gives more examples of structural
biases, along with an analytic framework for understanding them.
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agenda. Recent Republican calls to revive the nondelegation doctrine154 make more strategic sense in light of the possibility that
Democrats could control the White House with considerable frequency in the coming decades. Recent Democratic calls to eliminate
the legislative filibuster155 stem from the recognition of rare and brief
windows of unified control in a period of insecure majorities. Biases in
the electoral or lawmaking process matter little, in practice, if one
party can comfortably win elections and garner large governing coalitions regardless. But these same biases may matter enormously when
the parties compete roughly at parity.
Certain structural biases also become more countermajoritarian
in closely divided partisan environments. The small-state bias of the
Electoral College and the Senate, for instance, will continue to exist
and to favor Republicans as long as the political geography of the
United States looks as it does now. If one party were dominant, however, this bias would be less likely to yield presidents and Justices who
lack majority popular support (as measured, in the Justices’ case, by
the proportion of the U.S. population represented by senators voting
to confirm).156
In sum, the combination of polarization and closely divided parties is a recipe for structural constitutional conflict. Ideological, geographic, and demographic polarization bolster the presence and power
of numerous structural biases, while some structural biases may exacerbate polarization. Ideological polarization alone explains only part
of contemporary constitutional conflict. The interaction of ideological
and geographical polarization drives the new preemption, for
example, while the interaction of ideological and demographic polarization drives voter-suppression efforts. And the instability of partisan
control over institutions makes it more rational for politicians from
both parties to exploit structural biases when feasible.
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We organize our typology around the constitutional order’s relationship to the contemporary Democratic and Republican parties.
Many different controversies in many different areas of public law, the
typology helps show, share a common normative architecture. Often,
when Democrats denounce an institution such as the Electoral
College or Republicans denounce an institution such as the “deep
state,” the gravamen of the argument is that certain modes of
organizing government systematically favor one political side over
another, relative to an alternative arrangement that is at least as democratically defensible. Treating structural bias as a category provides a
conceptual vocabulary for describing and evaluating these sorts of
arguments. Disaggregating the category provides a map to some of the
recurring ways in which constitutional institutions produce political
winners and losers and, therefore, political conflicts.
Despite our contemporary and domestic focus, the typology has
wide potential applicability. Most of the institutions discussed in this
Part exist in various forms across the democratic world. The details
vary greatly across time and space; the basic insights about which sorts
of arrangements will be biased against which sorts of actors do not.
Our analysis therefore provides a model for similar inquiry in any constitutional system with meaningful political competition.
A. A Typology
1. Ex Ante Impediments to Lawmaking (Legislative Branch)

See text following supra note 29.
David Karol, American Political Parties: Exceptional No More, in SOLUTIONS TO
POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA 208, 212 (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015); see also
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates and American Public Law, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 756,
158
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All constitutional designers make choices that affect how easy or
hard it will be to enact and amend statutes. These choices will not
necessarily have clear partisan implications. If in a given period all
political parties share similar general orientations toward statutory
policymaking, then the rules governing the legislative process may not
manifest any structural bias. Yet as discussed in Part I, if one party
wishes to enact significantly more legislation than the other does
across multiple policy domains and election cycles, then procedural
barriers to lawmaking can have disparate consequences as between
the two.157
Such a partisan divide has opened up in the United States, and
structural bias has followed. “No other advanced industrialized
country has so many institutional veto points” as does the United
States.158 This longstanding feature of our constitutional order now
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impedes Democratic policy goals more than Republican policy goals
because Democrats now have more ambitious legislative agendas. In
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, Congresses controlled by Democrats considered more bills, held more committee
meetings, and passed more bills than Congresses controlled by
Republicans,159 while Democratic presidents tendered significantly
more policy proposals than their Republican counterparts.160
The first Congresses of recent presidencies illustrate this asymmetry. During the two years in which Democrats held unified control
of the political branches under President Obama, Congress passed
major economic,161 health care,162 financial regulatory,163 and civil
rights legislation164 on party-line or near-party-line votes.165
Democrats also mounted significant but ultimately unsuccessful legislative efforts to address climate change and immigration.166 The Biden
Administration, buoyed by a Democratic Congress, has begun by proposing a similarly aggressive legislative agenda on topics including
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757–60 (2012) (describing nine “vetogates” in the U.S. lawmaking process); Alfred Stepan
& Juan J. Linz, Comparative Perspectives on Inequality and the Quality of Democracy in the
United States, 9 PERSPS. ON POL. 841, 844 (2011) (reporting that among longstanding
democracies with advanced economies, only the United States has more than three
“electorally generated veto players . . . who potentially can block social change, by
blocking key bills or amendments”).
159 GROSSMANN & HOPKINS, supra note 34, at 264–65 (data from 1961 to 2012).
160 Id. at 267 (reporting that since 1945, “Democratic presidents made 39 percent more
proposals than Republicans overall and 62 percent more domestic policy proposals”); see
also id. at 260 (reporting that from 1945 to 2004, “policy changes” were more than three
times as likely to be liberal than conservative across the federal government).
161 E.g., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat.
115.
162 E.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
163 E.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
164 E.g., Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
165 E.g., Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515.
166 For critical overviews of these efforts, see Meg Jacobs, Obama’s Fight Against Global
Warming, in THE PRESIDENCY OF BARACK OBAMA: A FIRST HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT 62
(Julian E. Zelizer ed., 2018); Sarah R. Coleman, A Promise Unfulfilled, an Imperfect
Legacy: Obama and Immigration Policy, in id. at 179.
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immigration,167 racial justice,168 voting rights,169 and COVID-19
relief.170
The Trump Administration also enjoyed unified control on both
sides of Pennsylvania Avenue during its first two years. Yet its “sole
significant legislative accomplishment” during this period was a tax
bill,171 and its only other high-profile legislative undertaking was its
attempt to repeal the Affordable Care Act.172 Even in areas that were
policy priorities for the Trump Administration, such as restricting
immigration and relaxing regulation of business, it generally pursued
its goals through executive action rather than legislation.173
Multiple factors likely contribute to this asymmetry in legislative
ambition. Some political scientists emphasize the parties’ different
attitudes toward the role of government. “Elected Democrats tend to
treat policymaking as an attempt to address a catalog of social
problems,” Matt Grossmann and David Hopkins argue, “whereas
Republicans view policy disputes as battlegrounds in a broader philo167

See, e.g., U.S. Citizenship Act, H.R. 1177, 117th Cong. (2021).
See, e.g., Commission to Study and Develop Reparation Proposals for AfricanAmericans Act, H.R. 40, 117th Cong. (2021); see also Jacob M. Schlesinger, Biden Offers
Big Government Plan to Address Racial Inequality, WALL ST. J. (July 13, 2020, 10:00 AM),
https://wsj.com/articles/biden-offers-big-government-plan-to-address-racial-inequality11594648806 [https://perma.cc/V6W6-9B5Q] (contrasting Democratic support for “new
spending and initiatives” with Republicans’ “market-oriented approach” to addressing
racial inequality).
169 See, e.g., For the People Act of 2021, H.R. 1, 117th Cong.
170 See, e.g., American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4. See
generally Matthew Yglesias, Joe Biden Has a Plan for That, VOX (May 26, 2020, 8:00 AM),
https://vox.com/2020/5/26/21257648/joe-biden-climate-economy-tax-plans [https://perma.cc/
WGZ8-77MH] (describing Joe Biden’s “transformative” policy agenda as of May 2020 and
noting that much of it would require legislative action).
171 Charlie Cook, A White House That Can’t Shoot Straight, COOK POL. REP. (Jan. 8,
2018), https://cookpolitical.com/index.php/analysis/national/national-politics/white-housecant-shoot-straight [https://perma.cc/PRB4-XAVP] (referring to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,
Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017)).
172 For discussions of this effort, see generally Jonathan Cohn, The ACA, Repeal, and
the Politics of Backlash, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 6, 2020), https://healthaffairs.org/do/
10.1377/hblog20200305.771008/full [https://perma.cc/F339-5MWF]; Dylan Scott & Sarah
Kliff, Why Obamacare Repeal Failed, VOX (July 31, 2017, 11:40 AM), https://vox.com/
policy-and-politics/2017/7/31/16055960/why-obamacare-repeal-failed [https://perma.cc/
39RZ-9ALT].
173 See Toluse Olorunnipa & Ashley Parker, Trump’s Familiar Routine After Failing to
Cut Deals with Congress: Signing Legally Dubious Executive Actions, WASH. POST (Aug. 9,
2020, 3:00 PM), https://washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-dealmaker-congresscoronavirus/2020/08/09/8a5b13c0-da52-11ea-809e-b8be57ba616e_story.html [https://
perma.cc/9RV6-C2KT] (“It’s pretty striking that other than the December 2017 tax law,
basically all of the major moves by the Trump administration have been via executive
action, even though he had control of Congress [for two years] . . . .” (quoting Daniel
Hemel)).
168
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sophical conflict.”174 Closely related, the Democratic Party has
become a coalition of “social groups making specific programmatic
demands on government,” whereas the Republican Party is largely
“an ideological movement united by conservative values and skeptical
of the assumption that government action can ameliorate social
problems.”175 Others contend that Democrats have been able to
entrench key twentieth-century social welfare policies, such that it
would be politically difficult for Republicans to pursue revisionist legislation even if they might wish to do so in principle.176 In addition, as
the next Subsection explains, Republicans looking to cut back on economic regulation have a wider range of nonstatutory tools at their disposal than do Democrats looking to expand regulation.
Whatever its causes, this asymmetry means that the rules governing the legislative process cannot be neutral as between the parties’
policy agendas, for today’s Democratic Party has significantly more to
lose from veto points that increase the difficulty of enacting legislation. And as already mentioned, the U.S. constitutional order is awash
in such veto points.177 The written Constitution, of course, requires
that to become law a bill must pass each house of Congress and be
signed by the president,178 unless supermajorities in both chambers
override a presidential veto.179 Cameral rules in the House and Senate
establish numerous additional procedural hurdles beyond bicameralism and presentment—including a bevy of congressional committees
that most bills must clear and from which many never emerge.180
Some of these hurdles, in particular the Senate’s sixty-vote cloture
43872-nyu_97-1 Sheet No. 49 Side B
04/20/2022 12:00:09

174 GROSSMANN & HOPKINS, supra note 34, at 252; see also id. (“Democrats propose
major legislation more often and are more amenable to practical compromises . . . .
Republicans, in contrast, prefer a confrontational approach that relies more on procedural
brinkmanship in pursuit of total victory—which is often defined as the successful blockade
of Democratic initiatives.”).
175 Id. at 255–56.
176 See, e.g., ANDREA LOUISE CAMPBELL, HOW POLICIES MAKE CITIZENS: SENIOR
POLITICAL ACTIVISM AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 2 (2011) (explaining that
Social Security and Medicare have created a powerful constituency of senior citizens who
“actively defend their programs” against legislative “tamper[ing]”).
177 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
178 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
179 Id. cl. 3. Veto overrides are extremely rare. See Vetoes, 1789 to Present, U.S. SENATE,
https://senate.gov/legislative/vetoes/vetoCounts.htm [https://perma.cc/GBE9-DF7T]
(noting only 112 veto overrides since 1789).
180 The standard process in both chambers requires that a bill clear one or more
subcommittees and one or more committees, each with jurisdiction defined by subject
matter. See WALTER J. OLESZEK, MARK J. OLESZEK, ELIZABETH RYBICKI & BILL HENIFF
JR., CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 99–143 (10th ed. 2016). In
the House, the Rules Committee serves as an additional gatekeeper. See id. at 159–61. If
different versions of a bill pass in the House and Senate, a conference committee typically
crafts a final bill, which is then sent back to each chamber for a final vote. See id. at 330–75.
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requirement,181 are especially onerous in an age when neither party
enjoys political dominance.182
None of these features of the U.S. constitutional order is intrinsic
to any lawmaking process. Alternative arrangements are widely used
both within the United States and abroad. Congress itself has deviated
from its standard operating procedures for defined subject matter
areas, most notably by easing the rules for passage of budget legislation and trade agreements.183 State legislative procedures differ from
congressional procedures in ways that make it both easier and harder
to enact legislation. Most state legislatures do not have general
supermajority requirements comparable to the Senate cloture rule,184
although many erect other hurdles to legislation such as requiring that
each bill concern a single subject185 or allowing governors to exercise
a line-item veto.186 Meanwhile, every municipal legislature in the
country is unicameral,187 as is one state legislature.188 Many constitutional systems around the world employ bicameralism, but without
giving each chamber a “death lock over any legislation passed by the
other” like the U.S. version does.189
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181 STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE R. XXII(2), S. DOC. NO. 113-18 (2013), https://
rules.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CDOC-113sdoc18.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YKC-FF89].
182 See JENTLESON, supra note 121, at 9 (arguing that the filibuster has made the Senate
“a kill switch that cuts off broad-based solutions and shuts down our democratic process”);
id. at 5 (explaining that “the filibuster has mainly served to empower a minority of
predominately white conservatives”).
183 See generally MOLLY E. REYNOLDS, EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE: THE POLITICS OF
FILIBUSTER LIMITATIONS IN THE U.S. SENATE (2017) (detailing “majoritarian exceptions”
to the filibuster employed by the Senate in certain policy areas since the late 1960s).
184 MEGHAN REILLY, CONN. OFF. LEGIS. RSCH., 2009-R-0249, STATES LIMITING
LEGISLATIVE DEBATE (2009), https://cga.ct.gov/2009/rpt/2009-R-0249.htm [https://
perma.cc/ED6R-4M4Z]; Niraj Chokshi, In Many State Legislatures, It Wouldn’t Take Much
to Make Ted Cruz Stop Talking, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2013), https://washingtonpost.com/
blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/09/25/in-many-state-legislatures-it-wouldnt-take-much-to-maketed-cruz-stop-talking [https://perma.cc/5NQ4-CADN].
185 See generally Richard Briffault, The Single-Subject Rule: A State Constitutional
Dilemma, 82 ALBANY L. REV. 1629 (2019) (noting that forty-three state constitutions have
some sort of single-subject rule); Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the
Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803 (2006) (evaluating the effects of single-subject
rules).
186 See supra notes 51–58 and accompanying text.
187 See Noah M. Kazis, American Unicameralism: The Structure of Local Legislatures, 69
HASTINGS L.J. 1147, 1149 (2018) (“There are more than 90,000 local governments in the
United States. Each and every one has a single legislative chamber.” (footnote omitted)).
188 See CHARLYNE BERENS, ONE HOUSE: THE UNICAMERAL’S PROGRESSIVE VISION
FOR NEBRASKA 1 (2d ed. 2013) (“[Nebraska] is the only state in the nation with a onehouse, nonpartisan legislature.”). For making treaties, the federal Constitution requires
Senate supermajorities rather than bicameralism. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
189 LEVINSON, supra note 6, at 47. In most of these other systems, the “lower” house is
given the power to break deadlocks. Id. at 134.
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A number of other procedural rules also manifest bias by making
lawmaking more difficult, either as a general matter or on particular
topics with an ideological valence. Consider special procedural rules
governing tax legislation. Because the parties are polarized on tax
policy, rules that make it harder to raise taxes or easier to cut them
favor Republican agendas, while rules with the opposite effects favor
Democrats. The Constitution’s Origination Clause creates a special
hurdle to imposing taxes,190 although in practice it is easily circumvented.191 The budget reconciliation process once incorporated a bias
in the opposite direction (allowing tax increases but not tax cuts to
circumvent Senate cloture rules), but Congress has treated reconciliation as neutral as between tax cuts and tax increases since the 1990s.192
More generally, even relatively obscure rules that do not put a thumb
on the scale in favor of a specific outcome, such as rules restricting
earmarks and mandating public access to deliberations, have created
conditions in Congress increasingly inhospitable to legislative
dealmaking.193
Some state-level legislative procedural rules are even more overt
in the asymmetries they create between the two parties. Roughly a
third of the states, for instance, impose special supermajority requirements on proposed tax increases,194 which predictably aid smallgovernment Republicans. David Super has detailed how many features of states’ “fiscal constitutions,” from balanced budget requirements to accounting methods that encourage borrowing for large
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190 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (“All Bills for raising revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on
other Bills.”).
191 See Aziz Z. Huq, The Constitutional Law of Agenda Control, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
1401, 1448–49 (2016).
192 See Gould, supra note 18, at 1996–97.
193 On earmarks, see DIANA EVANS, GREASING THE WHEELS: USING PORK BARREL
PROJECTS TO BUILD MAJORITY COALITIONS 223 (2004) (arguing that “vote buying with
pork barrel projects is useful, even essential, . . . for passing general interest legislation” in
a body like the U.S. Congress whose majority leaders have limited ability to enforce party
discipline); John Hudak, Congress in 2019: Why the First Branch Should Bring Back
Earmarks, BROOKINGS (Dec. 27, 2018), https://brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/12/27/
congress-in-2019-why-the-first-branch-should-bring-back-earmarks [https://perma.cc/
K6ZU-ZP7J] (explaining that congressional Republicans “effectively banned” earmarks—
“individual provisions inserted into legislation . . . to direct benefits for specific projects in
specific places”—in 2011, with deleterious effects on legislative capacity). On transparency,
see David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 130–33 (2018)
(reviewing an extensive body of evidence indicating that 1970s reforms opening up
committee meetings and the House floor “made it more difficult for members of Congress
to negotiate with each other in candid, creative, and productive ways”).
194 See Supermajority Vote Requirements to Pass the Budget, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Nov. 9, 2018), https://ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/supermajority-voterequirements-to-pass-the-budget635542510.aspx [https://perma.cc/TA2S-VU2D].
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capital projects, work against programs serving low- and moderateincome people—and, by extension, against the Democratic lawmakers
who seek to enact such programs and the communities who benefit
from them.195
In sum, taking account of the parties’ mismatched legislative
ambitions casts congressional procedure in a new light. The many
institutional features that make lawmaking difficult at the federal level
have come to impede the policy aspirations of Democrats more than
those of Republicans—again, not just cyclically or episodically but systematically. When similar features exist in state or foreign legislative
bodies, those features can be understood as structurally biased against
legislatively ambitious parties in much the same way. Procedural rules
that treat certain types of legislation differently can create additional
asymmetric partisan effects. Biases in the legislative process are critically important in themselves, but they also put pressure on other
institutions. Rules that hamstring Congress will tend to channel policymaking elsewhere, including the administrative state, the courts,
and subnational governments. We turn next to structural biases in
these venues.
2. Ex Post Checks on Implementing or Enforcing Law (Executive
Branch)

04/20/2022 12:00:09

195 See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2605–40
(2005).
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Structural constitutional arrangements shape the implementation
and enforcement as well as the creation of statutory law. In a system
that makes legislating difficult, the rules governing executive branch
decisionmaking become all the more important. These rules, too, may
be structurally biased in situations where the political parties have
sharply divergent policy agendas.
Biases arising from veto points in the regulatory process parallel
those arising from veto points in the legislative process. The two parties have different general orientations toward implementing and
enforcing federal law. Crudely put, executive branch agencies that
administer programs and regulate industries are often viewed by
Democrats as critical to promoting the public interest, while many
Republicans would prefer to constrain or outright abolish these agencies. In recent years, Republican elected officials and opinion leaders
have called for eliminating the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the Internal Revenue Service, and the Departments of
Agriculture, Commerce, Education, Energy, Housing and Urban
Development, the Interior, and Transportation, as well as a host of
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smaller boards and programs.196 Even if some of these calls are more
rhetorical than substantive, they demonstrate the extent of
Republican hostility to the regulatory state. The political dynamics are
reversed for a small number of agencies, with Republicans rather than
Democrats favoring greater agency authority.197 But the overall asymmetry is plain. Democrats for the most part want more active and
empowered agencies. Republicans want the opposite.
This asymmetry means that structural arrangements that make it
harder for agencies to take initiative, relative to alternative arrangements employed in prior periods or endorsed by reformers, may be
biased against the contemporary Democratic Party. Nicholas Bagley
has documented how the “proceduralism” of administrative law—the
proliferation since the 1960s of procedural hurdles that agencies must
clear before acting—has had just this effect.198 Agencies seeking to
regulate in new or intensified ways face constraints of limited policy
windows and overstretched senior personnel, along with wellresourced and mobilized opponents in the private sector.199 More procedural requirements make it more likely that any of these forces will
thwart agency action. Using the notice-and-comment process to issue
a rule, as critics of administrative-law “ossification” have emphasized,
takes “a long time and an extensive commitment of agency
resources.”200 A growing set of transparency requirements, meanwhile, impose relatively modest obligations on the national security
agencies preferred by Republicans “while hobbling relatively visible
efforts to regulate health, safety, the economy, the environment, and
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196 See, e.g., Ted Cruz, Five for Freedom, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 11, 2015, 1:30 AM), https://
nationalreview.com/2015/11/ted-cruz-five-freedom [https://perma.cc/88Z6-G96D]; Jason
Plautz, How to Eliminate Almost Every Federal Agency, ATLANTIC (Aug. 13, 2014), https://
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/08/how-to-eliminate-almost-every-federal-agency/
452961 [https://perma.cc/UU9K-FFGM]; Brett Samuels, The 22 Agencies and Programs
Trump’s Budget Would Eliminate, THE HILL (Feb. 12, 2018, 1:28 PM), https://thehill.com/
homenews/administration/373441-the-federal-programs-trump-proposes-cutting-in-2019budget [https://perma.cc/8XU7-RZFD].
197 See, e.g., Rachel Levinson-Waldman & Haley Hinkle, The Abolish ICE Movement
Explained, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 30, 2018), https://brennancenter.org/our-work/
analysis-opinion/abolish-ice-movement-explained [https://perma.cc/KGL5-4ZAU].
198 See Bagley, supra note 59, at 358–69.
199 See id. at 361. On business power and regulation, see generally DAVID VOGEL,
FLUCTUATING FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL POWER OF BUSINESS IN AMERICA (1989);
BENJAMIN C. WATERHOUSE, LOBBYING AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF BUSINESS FROM
NIXON TO NAFTA (2015); WHAT’S GOOD FOR BUSINESS: BUSINESS AND AMERICAN
POLITICS SINCE WORLD WAR II (Kim Phillips-Fein & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2012).
200 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the
Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1493 (2012).
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civil rights.”201 The current structure of administrative procedure,
Bagley concludes, favors “inaction over action, deregulation over regulation, and nonenforcement over enforcement.”202
Executive branch regulatory review embodies a similar deregulatory bias. Since the 1980s, the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA), which sits within the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), has reviewed proposed regulations prior to their
taking effect.203 In theory, such an arrangement need not be biased for
or against regulation. But in practice, it has typically served to impede
or dilute rather than to generate or strengthen regulatory initiatives.
As Bagley and Richard Revesz have noted, “many of the features of
OMB review create a profound institutional bias against regulation—
a bias which is inexplicable except with reference to the implicit
Reagan-era belief that agencies will systematically overregulate.”204
This holds true even in “pro-regulatory presidential administrations.”205 Despite a fleeting experiment with “prompt letters” as a tool
to encourage agencies to act,206 OMB review has consistently favored
the Republican Party’s deregulatory agenda.
Beyond veto points, more specific rules governing executive
branch policymaking can be structurally biased. For instance, a fierce
controversy from a prior generation suggests at least one respect in
which today’s budget rules are structurally biased in favor of higher
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201 David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1111 (2017); see also Pozen, supra note 193, at 156 (explaining
that U.S. transparency laws have evolved since the 1960s in ways that make them “harder
to square with the progressive commitment to energetic, egalitarian government than with
a libertarian vision of a minimalist state authorized primarily to protect citizens against
violent threats”).
202 Bagley, supra note 59, at 368–69.
203 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and
Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1845–63 (2013).
204 Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1262 (2006); see also David J. Barron, From Takeover to
Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1095, 1112 (2008) (observing that “OIRA review . . . is much more deregulatory in
orientation because of the substantive inquiry that it requires OIRA analysts to
undertake”); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative
State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 72–73
(2006) (reporting interview results in which former EPA officials of both parties who
served from 1989 to 2001 overwhelmingly characterize OIRA as a deregulatory force).
205 Barron, supra note 204, at 1114 (“OIRA review has a consistent deregulatory
influence even in pro-regulatory presidential administrations.”).
206 See Curtis W. Copeland, The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs in Federal Rulemaking, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1257, 1289–90 (2006) (noting a
small number of prompt letters during President George W. Bush’s first term); Michael A.
Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101
GEO. L.J. 1337, 1381 (2013) (observing that “the practice of prompt letters was always ad
hoc” and was not “continued by the Obama Administration”).
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spending and thus the contemporary Democratic Party. For nearly
two centuries, presidents held the power of impoundment, which
allowed them to decline to spend funds appropriated by Congress.207
Impoundment was used by presidents of both parties.208 But like the
line-item veto, impoundment is a one-way ratchet, in that it allows a
president unilaterally to reduce federal spending but not to increase it.
The different attitudes of the two parties toward federal spending209
came to lend that feature a partisan cast. A Republican president
could use impoundment authority to target various social welfare programs, especially less popular programs benefiting the poor, while a
Democratic president with this authority would find fewer politically
plausible uses for it. A prohibition on impoundment is accordingly
biased toward Democrats, relative to rules that allow the practice.
Consistent with this analysis, when Congress ultimately banned
impoundment in 1974, the ban was passed by Democratic congressional majorities reacting to aggressive use of impoundment authority
by a Republican chief executive.210
3. Ex Post Checks on Implementing or Enforcing Law (Judicial
Branch)
Turning from the second branch to the third, the organization of
judicial power can also be structurally biased in multiple respects.
Here, we consider possible biases arising from the two central ways in
which federal courts interact with Congress and the executive: strongform constitutional review of laws and regulations, and judicial review
of agency decisionmaking.211
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207 See Ralph S. Abascal & John R. Kramer, Presidential Impoundment Part I: Historical
Genesis and Constitutional Framework, 62 GEO. L.J. 1549, 1577–618 (1974) (documenting
the history of impoundment); Christopher Wlezien, The Politics of Impoundments, 47 POL.
RSCH. Q. 59, 60 (1994) (noting that “the bulk of the impoundments [prior to the 1970s]
tended to be noncontroversial”).
208 See Gerald A. Figurski, Presidential Impoundment of Funds: A Constitutional Crisis,
7 AKRON L. REV. 107, 111 (1973) (describing how “Presidents from FDR on impounded
various programs and irritated Congress in the process”).
209 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
210 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88
Stat. 297; see CHAFETZ, supra note 18, at 64–66 (discussing this episode).
211 Many other ostensibly neutral features of judicial practice might be considered part
of structural constitutional law, at least on some accounts, and give rise to structural bias—
from substantive rules governing judicial review of actions taken by state and local
officials, to procedural rules governing access to court, to remedial rules governing
plaintiffs’ ability to obtain monetary or injunctive relief from different sorts of defendants.
Investigation of possible structural biases caused by these features is an important and
complex task that we reserve for future work. Restrictive standing rules, for instance, could
cut in a liberal direction insofar as they insulate social welfare and regulatory policies from
industry challenges, while at the same time cutting in a conservative direction insofar as
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The U.S. federal judiciary exercises a paradigmatic version of
“strong-form” judicial review, in which “the courts have general
authority to determine what the Constitution means” and “the courts’
constitutional interpretations are authoritative and binding on the
other branches,” including Congress.212 While the legal literature on
judicial review often focuses on its complex relationship to democracy,213 judicial review can also be understood more simply as an additional veto point in the legislative process.214 Even if a statute
manages to satisfy bicameralism and presentment, courts can still prevent it from taking effect by deeming it incompatible with the
Constitution. A veto-point perspective becomes all the more resonant
at a time when the federal courts are increasingly polarized along the
same left-right axis as the rest of government.215
Understanding constitutional judicial review as a veto point raises
the possibility that, like other veto points, it might be structurally
biased. Given the asymmetry in the legislative agendas of the two parties, contemporary Democrats have more to lose from strong-form
judicial review of federal statutes than do contemporary Republicans,
just as they have more to lose from analogous veto points in Congress
and the executive branch. It is easy to imagine a conservative
Supreme Court overturning future progressive legislation on constitutional grounds.216 By contrast, if a liberal Supreme Court were to exist
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they stymie challenges to race discrimination, environmental misconduct, or the like.
Which effect dominates, and with what consequences for the policy goals of the two major
political parties, is an empirical question not well illuminated by the formal content of the
rules themselves.
212 Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2781, 2784
(2003); see also Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Weak and Strong Judicial Review, 22 LAW &
PHIL. 381, 381 (2003) (“Strong judicial review finds its paradigm in the Unites States . . . .”).
213 See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
(1980); Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1952).
214 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1529, 1535 (2000) (“[C]ourts can add an additional veto to rightsrestricting government action . . . .”); David Watkins & Scott Lemieux, Compared to What?
Judicial Review and Other Veto Points in Contemporary Democratic Theory, 13 PERSP. ON
POL. 312, 312 (2015) (“In modern democratic political systems, judicial review is one of
many potential veto points.”).
215 See, e.g., Christopher Sundby & Suzanna Sherry, Term Limits and Turmoil: Roe v.
Wade’s Whiplash, 98 TEX. L. REV. 121, 133–34 & nn.55–60 (2019) (summarizing evidence
that “the Court increasingly votes along ideological lines that are predictable and closely
aligned with the views and preferences of political parties”).
216 See Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 110, at 1719 (noting that “the single most
important driver of Supreme Court reform debate” in recent years has been Democrats’
fear that the judiciary will become “a stronghold of resistance against progressive
legislative ambition”); see also Robin West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 NW. U. L.
REV. 241, 251 (1993) (arguing that judicial review has a conservative slant because
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during a future period of Republican control of the political branches,
those branches may not produce as much ambitious domestic legislation that could be challenged in court.217
A cursory glance at U.S. history provides support for the proposition that judicial review of federal statutes tends to be biased against
left-leaning political programs—a proposition that early twentiethcentury progressives took as given.218 The Supreme Court has struck
down or severely narrowed significant parts of Reconstruction Era,219
Progressive Era,220 and New Deal statutes.221 In recent decades, the
Court has struck down progressive legislative achievements including
the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion,222 the Voting Rights
Act’s coverage formula,223 the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act’s background-check provision,224 and the Violence Against
Women Act’s civil remedy.225 To be sure, counterexamples exist; the
Democratic coalition includes civil libertarians who are more skeptical
of state power than those on its left flank; collecting prominent cases
cannot in itself prove a conservative bias; and this bias has waned if
not disappeared in certain eras, in particular the Warren Court years
of 1953 to 1969. Yet all that said, any number of more systematic
studies support the conclusion that judicial review of federal legislation “has been overwhelmingly conservative through the history of the
Court.”226
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“progressive gains require a degree of legislative experimentalism that judicially imposed
constitutional constraints inhibit”).
217 See supra notes 165–76 and accompanying text.
218 See, e.g., Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First
Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1965 (2018) (explaining that these progressives
saw federal courts as “the inveterate guardians of private property and persecutors of
organized labor”); Laura M. Weinrib, Civil Liberties Outside the Courts, 2014 SUP. CT.
REV. 297, 304 (explaining that New Deal reformers generally sought to implement their
economic-reform “vision in spite of, rather than through, the courts”).
219 E.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214
(1876).
220 E.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); United States v. E.C. Knight, 156
U.S. 1 (1895).
221 E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S.
1 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
222 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
223 Shelby Cnty v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
224 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
225 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
226 Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and Deference
on the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893, 896 n.19 (2003); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 6 (2015) (arguing that throughout U.S. history,
the Supreme Court “often has upheld discrimination and even egregious violations of basic
liberties,” “has been far more likely to rule in favor of corporations than workers or
consumers,” and “has been far more likely to uphold government abuses of power than to
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The argument that strong-form judicial review is biased toward
small-government conservativism might lose much of its force in a
system where the constitutional courts were inclined and able to spur
the legislature into taking action to promote social rights or social welfare. This is not our system, at least at the federal level. Unlike most
written constitutions in effect today, the U.S. Constitution is generally
viewed as “a charter of negative rather than positive liberties.”227
Other constitutional courts recognize doctrines such as “legislative
omission” that they can employ to force legislatures to regulate in the
service of social and economic entitlements.228 No such doctrine exists
in the United States, and “even at the high tide of their political ascendancy, liberals couldn’t get the Supreme Court to commit to distributive entitlements of any kind.”229 While the libertarian tilt of
constitutional judicial review may be especially acute in this country,
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stop them”). On the historical aberrance of the Warren Court’s liberalism relative to the
generally conservative character of U.S. judicial review, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 3 (1998) (describing the Warren Court as
being “increasingly recognized as having initiated a unique and revolutionary chapter in
American constitutional history”); David Luban, The Warren Court and the Concept of a
Right, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 7, 7 (1999) (“The Warren Court, after all, was not just
the most liberal Supreme Court in American history, but arguably the only liberal
Supreme Court in American history.”). For a comprehensive history of judicial review of
federal legislation, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ACTS OF CONGRESS FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE PRESENT (2019).
227 Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.); see also, e.g.,
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (“[O]ur cases
have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to
governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property
interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.”); Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) (“As a general matter, a State is under no constitutional
duty to provide substantive services for those within its border.”); David S. Law & Mila
Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762,
806–07 (2012) (describing the U.S. Constitution as “rooted in a libertarian constitutional
tradition that is inherently antithetical to the notion of positive rights” and demonstrating
that it is increasingly a global outlier in not expressly providing for such rights). Within the
United States, judicial enforcement of positive constitutional rights is far more prevalent at
the state level. See EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES:
WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS (2013).
228 See generally VENICE COMM’N, GENERAL REPORT OF THE XIVTH CONGRESS OF THE
CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS ON PROBLEMS OF LEGISLATIVE
OMISSION IN CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE (Sc. R. Dürr, T. Gerwien, D. Jones, A.
Gorey & M.-L. Wigishoff eds., 2008), https://www.venice.coe.int/files/Bulletin/SpecBulllegislative-omission-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AXE-7ZX5] (reviewing this doctrine in
European constitutional jurisprudence); David Landau & Rosalind Dixon, Abusive
Judicial Review: Courts Against Democracy, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1313, 1368–70 (2020)
(reviewing this doctrine in Latin American constitutional jurisprudence).
229 Samuel Moyn, The Court Is Not Your Friend, DISSENT (Winter 2020), https://
www.dissentmagazine.org/article/the-court-is-not-your-friend [https://perma.cc/6ZK3SSXR]; see also David E. Pozen & Kim Lane Scheppele, Executive Underreach, in
Pandemics and Otherwise, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 608, 615–16 (2020) (reviewing ways in which
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given our negative-rights-oriented text and tradition, there is some
evidence that it generalizes broadly. One leading comparative study,
for instance, provides a political and cultural account of why judicial
enforcement of constitutional rights has been less effective at fostering
egalitarianism than at “shielding the economic sphere from attempts
to reduce socioeconomic disparity through regulatory and redistributive means.”230
Judicial review of agency action can be structurally biased in
much the same way as strong-form constitutional judicial review of
statutes. A critical threshold issue is which sorts of agency behaviors
will be subject to judicial scrutiny in the first instance. Whereas U.S.
agencies seeking to initiate enforcement proceedings must be prepared to defend their actions in court, under Heckler v. Chaney 231 and
associated cases no such burden attends most decisions to decline to
enforce. “Agencies can thus gut existing rules by enforcing them less
vigorously—without observing any procedural niceties at all.”232
Whichever party does not hold the presidency is apt to decry nonenforcement decisions.233 But this sort of flip-flopping should not
obscure the deeper dynamic. Subjecting agency enforcement action to
regular judicial review, while sparing agency nonenforcement, results
in a structural bias toward nonenforcement of regulatory statutes and
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the U.S. constitutional system “is especially inhospitable to legal challenges” to
government “underreach”).
230 RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 218 (2004); see also JUDICIAL POWER AND THE LEFT:
NOTES ON A SKEPTICAL TRADITION (Richard Ekins & Graham Gee eds., 2017) (collecting
essays from European and American authors emphasizing the longstanding tension
between judicial review and progressive politics). Specifying the conditions under which
constitutional judicial review of statutes will not have a rightward tilt is well beyond the
scope of this Article; the claim here is that the traditional U.S. model has such a tilt.
231 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (holding that executive nonenforcement decisions are
presumptively unreviewable).
232 Bagley, supra note 59, at 365; see also id. at 366 (“On occasion, the courts will rebuke
agencies for adopting categorical nonenforcement policies, but agencies face virtually no
litigation risk if they don’t publicly codify those policies (and little risk even if they do).”
(footnotes omitted)). While Heckler sets out the contemporary administrative law
framework, nonenforcement has long been a means for opponents of a federal statute’s
goals to blunt its impact without judicial remedy. See, e.g., PAMELA BRANDWEIN,
RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION 28 (2011) (“[A] pattern
materialized and spread in the wake of the [civil rights] acts of 1866 and 1867: the local and
systematic refusal to punish Klan violence and intimation aimed at blacks, white
Republicans, and Freedmen’s Bureau agents.”).
233 See Zachary S. Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, 65 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1119,
1123–36 (2015) (describing criticisms leveled against Presidents Reagan, Bush II, and
Obama).
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toward parties that have a consistently stronger interest in such
nonenforcement.234
A similar, if slightly milder, asymmetry exists with respect to judicial review of agency rulemakings. Plaintiffs routinely bring lawsuits
alleging that rulemakings exceeded an agency’s statutory authority or
were arbitrary and capricious. Courts will sometimes review decisions
not to engage in rulemaking, as exemplified by Massachusetts v.
EPA.235 But in the main, courts have invoked “agency resource allocation and the limits of judicial capacity to carve out a thoroughly
deferential approach to review of agency denials of rulemaking petitions.”236 Whereas regulated entities can almost always challenge
agency rulemakings, those who might benefit from new, never-issued
rules have fewer opportunities to seek judicial relief.
Limits on more searching judicial review can serve as a partial
counterweight to this bias. Consider the practice of courts deferring to
reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous or silent statutes
under Chevron, rather than reviewing those interpretations de
novo.237 Whichever party controls the White House can benefit from
Chevron deference, but again there is an asymmetric effect that transcends the rotation of power. Recent Democratic administrations
have relied heavily on agency rulemaking to implement new statutes238 and to help adapt old statutes to new policy challenges in the
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234 While a number of Trump Administration deregulatory actions were enjoined by the
courts, see Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts, INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY
(Apr. 1, 2021), https://policyintegrity.org/trump-court-roundup [https://perma.cc/N3FFE8WV] (collecting cases), most of those decisions rested on agency failures to follow the
procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act or to provide a reasoned
explanation for policy changes—leaving intact the underlying asymmetry created by
Heckler. But cf. Benjamin Eidelson, Reasoned Explanation and Political Accountability in
the Roberts Court, 130 YALE L.J. 1748, 1795–98 (2021) (suggesting that a nascent
“accountability-forcing” approach to rationality review could lead to expanded judicial
review of nonenforcement policies in the future).
235 549 U.S. 497 (2007); see id. at 532–34 (finding that the EPA had denied a rulemaking
petition based on impermissible considerations and failed to provide a “reasoned
explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause or contribute to
climate change”).
236 Daniel E. Walters, Symmetry’s Mandate: Constraining the Politicization of American
Administrative Law, 119 MICH. L. REV. 455, 495 (2020).
237 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
238 Implementing the Dodd–Frank Act, for instance, “require[d] the development of
some 250 new regulatory rules and various mandated studies.” Douglas D. Evanoff &
William F. Moeller, Dodd–Frank: Content, Purpose, Implementation Status, and Issues, 36
ECON. PERSPS. 75, 75 (2012); see also Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N (last modified Dec. 23,
2020), https://sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml [https://perma.cc/KK7P-WD6D]
(compiling rules, reports, and studies issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission
under Dodd–Frank).
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face of congressional gridlock, perhaps most notably in the environmental context.239 Chevron plays a crucial role in safeguarding these
efforts from industry attack.240 While Republican administrations
sometimes rely on Chevron in pursuit of deregulatory aims, they have
many other deregulatory tools at their disposal: They can decline to
enforce regulatory statutes, grant waivers to regulated entities, refuse
to appoint or confirm regulators, or seek to limit agencies’
resources.241 Once the full panoply of pro- and anti-regulatory tools
available to the parties is taken into account, it becomes apparent that
Chevron deference is more valuable to contemporary Democrats than
to contemporary Republicans.242
4. Executive Branch Organization and Personnel
We have focused thus far on the policymaking process, where a
plethora of veto points in all three branches broadly favor those who
would prefer to see government do less. Conservatives, however, have
recently argued that a different set of structural biases, arising from
the composition of the federal bureaucracy and from legal limits on
the president’s control of it, prevent them from accomplishing their
policy goals.
These arguments have some force, but the overall story of structural bias in this area is mixed. The U.S. federal bureaucracy is staffed
predominantly by civil servants, who are protected by law from politically motivated coercion243 and retaliation for whistleblowing.244
These sorts of protections can have a partisan or ideological bias, rela43872-nyu_97-1 Sheet No. 55 Side B
04/20/2022 12:00:09

239 See JAMES E. MCCARTHY & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41561,
EPA REGULATIONS: TOO MUCH, TOO LITTLE, OR ON TRACK? (2016) (providing a detailed
overview of EPA rulemaking during the Obama Administration); Jody Freeman & David
B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 17–63 (2014) (describing
EPA and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission efforts to adapt old statutes to modern
challenges, primarily under the Obama Administration).
240 Cf. Freeman & Spence, supra note 239, at 69 n.299 (noting that judicial review of
every agency decision discussed in their article would “invoke the Chevron doctrine”).
241 See Elinson & Gould, supra note 113 (manuscript at 7, 53–55).
242 See id. at 46–52 (explicating this bias and the various reasons for it); see also MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING BACK THE CONSTITUTION: ACTIVIST JUDGES AND THE NEXT AGE OF
AMERICAN LAW 162 (2020) (arguing that Chevron is “a major benefit” to agencies seeking
to regulate (or “re-regulate”) under conditions of congressional gridlock and only “a small
benefit” to agencies seeking to deregulate, such that abandoning the doctrine would on
balance serve the cause of “deconstruct[ing] the administrative state”).
243 See, e.g., Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111
(codified as amended throughout 5 U.S.C.) (establishing various legal protections and
remedies for federal civil servants).
244 See JON O. SHIMABUKURO, L. PAIGE WHITAKER & EMILY E. ROBERTS, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R43045, SURVEY OF FEDERAL WHISTLEBLOWER AND ANTI-RETALIATION
LAWS (2013) (summarizing federal whistleblower statutes); see also Shawn Marie Boyne,
Whistleblowing, 62 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 425, 428 (2014) (“Outside the national security
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tive to at-will employment or other less politically insulated arrangements, if bureaucrats tend to hold either left- or right-of-center
views.245 Federal employees in the aggregate lean Democratic,246
although their politics vary considerably across agencies. One prominent study found strong liberal leanings among employees at some
agencies (most notably the EPA, Federal Trade Commission, and
National Labor Relations Board) and strong conservative leanings
among employees at others (most notably the Department of Defense
and Department of Homeland Security).247 Republicans are therefore
correct that rules insulating the bureaucracy from political control or
otherwise empowering civil servants may be biased toward Democrats
in the case of contemporary regulatory and social welfare agencies.248
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employment sector, the breadth and depth of whistleblower protections in the United
States has grown exponentially since the Watergate era.”).
245 Cf. Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 515, 540–47 (2015) (characterizing the federal civil service as a potential
“administrative counterweight” and “institutional rival” to “domineering” presidents and
political appointees).
246 Federal employees have preferred Democratic candidates by significant margins in
recent presidential elections. See Eric Katz, Clinton Significantly Widens Lead over Trump
Among Federal Employees, Poll Shows, GOV’T EXEC. (Oct. 28, 2016), https://govexec.com/
management/2016/10/clinton-drastically-grows-lead-over-trump-among-federal-employeespoll-shows/132742 [https://perma.cc/YUS9-4K6Y]; Eric Katz, Poll: Biden Leads Trump
Among Federal Workforce by 28%, GOV’T EXEC. (Sept. 18, 2020), https://govexec.com/
workforce/2020/09/poll-biden-leads-trump-among-federal-workforce-28/168581 [https://
perma.cc/TMN7-7XA8]; Kellie Lunney, Poll: Obama Leads Romney Among Government
Workers, GOV’T EXEC. (Aug. 21, 2012), [https://perma.cc/ZHC6-EVRU]. One recent
empirical study found, based on several decades of campaign contribution data, that “civil
servants cluster left-of-center.” Brian D. Feinstein & Abby K. Wood, Divided Agencies, 95
S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 24), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3925861
[https://perma.cc/TMP3-H98H].
247 Joshua D. Clinton, Anthony Bertelli, Christian R. Grose, David E. Lewis & David C.
Nixon, Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology of Agencies, Presidents, and
Congress, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 341, 348–49 (2011) (reporting results of a large-scale survey
of federal executive branch employees); see also Mark D. Richardson, Joshua D. Clinton &
David E. Lewis, Elite Perceptions of Agency Ideology and Workforce Skill, 80 J. POL. 303,
306–08 (2017) (summarizing results from several prior studies). During the Trump
Administration, science-focused entities within federal agencies were seen by many as
especially liberal outposts. See, e.g., Sean Reilly, Kelsey Brugger, Maxine Joselow & Ariel
Wittenberg, EPA Science Advisers Slammed the Agency for Ignoring Science. Here Is What
They Said, SCIENCE (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.science.org/content/article/epa-scienceadvisers-slammed-agency-ignoring-science-here-what-they-said [perma.cc/56FL-GQ9S]
(describing efforts by the EPA’s Science Advisory Board to push back against actions
taken by Trump political appointees).
248 Like most of the structural biases discussed in the Article, this bias is historically
contingent. Any number of federal agencies now seen as liberal were, in prior periods,
racially segregated in their composition and racially reactionary in their policymaking. On
composition, see generally DESMOND KING, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: BLACK
AMERICANS AND THE U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1997); ERIC S. YELLIN, RACISM IN
THE NATION’S SERVICE: GOVERNMENT WORKERS AND THE COLOR LINE IN WOODROW
WILSON’S AMERICA (2013). On policymaking, see, for example, RICHARD ROTHSTEIN,
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The upshot has been Republican efforts at the federal and state levels
to limit civil service protections.249
Given the civil service’s ideological profile, legal arrangements
that allow for so-called independent agencies can likewise give rise to
structural bias. Such arrangements have a long constitutional pedigree250 and are typically justified as necessary to shield “expert decisionmakers from the shifting winds of politics.”251 The past several
decades, however, have witnessed the rise of a “unitary executive”
theory that would give the president exclusive authority to “direct,
control, and supervise inferior officers or agencies.”252 Consistent with
the view that there is a liberal bias to the status quo of agency independence,253 these ideas have been developed and promoted almost
entirely by conservative judges and scholars.254 While there is no clear
empirical evidence that bureaucratic insulation has enabled
Democratic civil servants to subvert Republican policy programs,255
there is also no evidence about the counterfactual: Who would benefit
from greater presidential control over the administrative state?
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THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED
AMERICA (2017).
249 See, e.g., Erich Wagner, ‘Stunning’ Executive Order Would Politicize Civil Service,
GOV’T EXEC. (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.govexec.com/management/2020/10/stunningexecutive-order-would-politicize-civil-service/169479 [https://perma.cc/K92Y-H3SQ]
(discussing an executive order signed by President Trump in late 2020 that would
effectively convert thousands of federal civil servants into at-will employees); Jonathan
Walters, Life After Civil Service Reform: The Texas, Georgia, and Florida Experiences,
GOVERNING MAG., Oct. 2002, at 1, https://sites.duke.edu/niou/files/2011/05/Walters-Lifeafter-Civil-Service-Reform-The-Texas-George-and-Florida-Experiences.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q4FW-GN37] (providing case studies of civil service reform in three states).
250 See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (“The authority
of Congress, in creating quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies, to require them to act
in discharge of their duties independently of executive control cannot well be doubted.”);
see also 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2018) (listing independent agencies).
251 Emily H. Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61
DUKE L.J. 1763, 1778 (2012); see also id. at 1779 (“Other reasons for creating independent
agencies involve maintaining stability, providing insulation from interest-group capture,
and protecting against bureaucratic drift.”).
252 Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1165 (1992).
253 See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence on
Agency Policy-Making, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1, 25 n.137 (1994) (citing sources on such views
during the Nixon and Reagan Administrations); see also JASON CHAFFETZ, THE DEEP
STATE: HOW AN ARMY OF BUREAUCRATS PROTECTED BARACK OBAMA AND IS WORKING
TO DESTROY THE TRUMP AGENDA (2018).
254 See Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Helping Ideas Have Consequences: Political and
Intellectual Investment in the Unitary Executive Theory, 1981–2000, 89 DENV. U. L. REV.
197 (2011) (tracing the post-1970s rise of the unitary executive theory as a central project
of the conservative legal movement); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Political Economy of the
Removal Power, 134 HARV. L. REV. 352, 375–89 (2020) (same).
255 Bagley & Revesz, supra note 204, at 1300.
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See MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41872, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS,
SENATE’S CONFIRMATION PROCESS, AND CHANGES MADE IN THE 112TH CONGRESS 7
(2012); Brad Plumer, Does the Senate Really Need to Confirm 1,200 Executive Branch
Jobs?, WASH. POST (July 16, 2013), https://washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/
07/16/does-the-senate-really-need-to-confirm-1200-executive-branch-jobs [https://perma.cc/
BK2V-Q5RA].
257 Cody Derespina, Trump: No Plans to Fill “Unnecessary” Appointed Positions, FOX
NEWS (Feb. 28, 2017), https://foxnews.com/politics/trump-no-plans-to-fill-unnecessaryappointed-positions [https://perma.cc/X8YC-EEER].
258 See Pozen, supra note 21, at 4–6; Jonathan Cohn, The New Nullification: GOP v.
Obama Nominees, NEW REPUBLIC (July 19, 2011), https://newrepublic.com/article/92167/
cordray-warren-cfpb-obama-republicans-nomination [https://perma.cc/G4FA-252F].
259 See Dave Clarke, Republicans Block Obama’s Consumer Nominee, REUTERS (Dec.
8, 2011, 12:26 AM), https://reuters.com/article/us-financial-regulation-cordray/republicansblock-obamas-consumer-nominee-idUSTRE7B709R20111208 [https://perma.cc/F5AD9S4N]. For a broad overview of Republican efforts to thwart the CFPB both before and
after its creation, see Sitaraman, supra note 254, at 356–75.
260 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Actings, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 613, 694–99 (2020).
THE
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Republican proponents of unitary executive theories may well be correct that they would profit from such a change.
A structural bias in the other direction may exist in rules governing appointments of agency leaders. Federal law requires presidential nomination and Senate confirmation for over a thousand
executive branch officials.256 The rules are formally neutral as
between the parties, but they have disparate impacts on the two.
When Republicans control the White House, they can drag their feet
on making appointments that would enable disfavored agencies to
carry out their missions. “[I]n many cases,” as President Trump
acknowledged in 2017, “we don’t want to fill [executive branch] jobs
. . . because they’re unnecessary to have.”257
The dynamic is different when Democrats control the White
House. During the Obama Administration, Senate Republicans
attempted, often successfully, to block appointments as a means of
undermining various agencies.258 Perhaps the most pointed example
involved the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). After
failing to prevent the creation of the CFPB in 2010, Republicans
refused to hold an up-or-down vote on President Obama’s nominee to
run the bureau in order to leverage changes in the bureau’s structure
and disable it from bringing enforcement actions that required a confirmed director.259 Agencies that lack Senate-confirmed leadership
have been found to be less productive and to have lower employee
morale.260 Moreover, the confirmation process itself consumes valuable Senate floor time that could otherwise be devoted to legislative
efforts. Democrats are more dependent on confirmed nominees for
their policy agendas, and they incur greater opportunity costs for time
spent on the confirmation process. The rules governing appointments
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of agency leaders can therefore be seen as biased toward Republicans
relative to alternative arrangements, including those employed in virtually every other democracy, that subject fewer executive branch
positions to any sort of legislative vote.261
5. Federalism
The organization of the U.S. government into multiple layers—
federal, state, and local—can also give rise to structural biases. This
overarching organization has complex and cross-cutting effects, and
many people’s views on federalism vary depending on which parties
currently hold power at the state and national levels.262 But certain
features of U.S. federalism seem to have more persistent biases, and
there are reasons to believe that federalism on the whole benefits the
contemporary Republican Party.
As is well known, federalism can at times lead to a “race to the
bottom,” wherein state officials compete against each other to attract
business by lowering taxes, limiting liability, or reducing regulation. In
Justice Louis Brandeis’s words, interstate regulatory competition can
be “one not of diligence but of laxity.”263 South Dakota, for example,
became a center of the national credit card industry in the early 1980s
by eliminating its usury cap.264 Year in and year out, state and local
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261 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency
Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 935 (2009) (explaining that there are “far more political
jobs in the American administrative state than in other developed countries”). Congress
has taken modest steps in recent years to lower the number of appointees requiring Senate
confirmation. See, e.g., Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011,
Pub. L. No. 112-166, 126 Stat. 1283 (2012) (exempting certain presidential appointments
from Senate approval). Separate from these steps, any pro-Republican structural bias
arising from the difficulty of the confirmation process is smaller today than it was a decade
ago, on account of the elimination in 2013 of the filibuster for executive branch nominees.
See William G. Dauster, The Senate in Transition or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the Nuclear Option, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 631, 645–48 (2016). Prior to
this rule change, nominees could be blocked by the minority party in the Senate even when
the other party controlled both the White House and the Senate.
262 See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 32, at 1078–122 (arguing that partisanship shapes
Americans’ identification with states and state challenges to federal policy); Posner &
Sunstein, supra note 3, at 488 (discussing federalism flip-flops, in which people alternately
“promote or deride federalism based on their views of the substantive political outcomes at
stake”); Louis Michael Seidman, Substitute Arguments in Constitutional Law, 31 J.L. &
POL. 237, 285 (2016) (“Even a casual observer of American constitutional culture knows
that federalism provides fertile turf for hypocritical [arguments].”).
263 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in
part).
264 See Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social Provision, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1093,
1139–40 (2019).
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governments offer businesses tens of billions of dollars in special tax
incentives to relocate to or remain within their jurisdiction.265
Beyond the race-to-the-bottom risks that are endemic to federalist systems, specific doctrines associated with U.S. federalism can
create more specific forms of deregulatory bias. Consider the
Supreme Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent
Businesses v. Sebelius 266 (NFIB), which struck down as impermissibly
coercive the Affordable Care Act’s use of funding conditions to
induce states to expand Medicaid.267 Roughly half of the states
declined to expand Medicaid in the aftermath of the Court’s ruling,
denying health insurance to millions of Americans,268 and at this
writing a dozen states still have not expanded Medicaid.269 The
Court’s anti-coercion logic could in theory apply to a Republicansponsored law just as to a Democratic-sponsored law. But the absence
of any plausible real-world examples of the former points toward a
structural bias. Because Democrats are more reliant on cooperative
federalism programs in carrying out their policy agendas and strengthening social welfare regimes, judge-made limits on how the federal
government may spur states to partner in administering such regimes
have a conservative slant.
Judicial doctrine on federal preemption of state law manifests a
similar bias.270 The basic principle of preemption seems politically
neutral: “[A]ny state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must
yield.”271 As a practical matter, however, most preemption cases
43872-nyu_97-1 Sheet No. 58 Side A
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265 See, e.g., Evan Mast, Race to the Bottom? Local Tax Break Competition and Business
Location, 12 AM. ECON. J. APPLIED ECON. 288, 288 (2020) (“State and local governments
in the United States spend approximately $45 billion each year on tax incentives that aim
to attract businesses or encourage the growth of existing businesses.”).
266 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
267 Id. at 575–88. For an illuminating analysis of this portion of the Court’s ruling, see
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause after NFIB,
101 GEO. L.J. 861 (2013).
268 See Samuel L. Dickman, David U. Himmelstein, Danny McCormick & Steffie
Woolhandler, Health and Financial Consequences of 24 States’ Decision to Opt Out of
Medicaid Expansion, 45 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVS. 133, 136–37 (2015) (describing post-ACA
uninsured populations and estimating loss of insurance and excess deaths from state optouts).
269 See Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions: Interactive Map, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Nov. 2, 2020), https://kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-state-medicaidexpansion-decisions-interactive-map [https://perma.cc/P34X-B8HH].
270 We focus here on federal-state preemption, but state preemption of municipal law
can also be structurally biased in favor of conservative outcomes. See supra notes 41–43
and accompanying text.
271 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666
(1962)).
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involve “claims by business entities that rigorous regulation at the
state level must give way to . . . less rigorous regulation at the national
level,” “ranging from oil tanker safety rules in Washington and air
pollution standards in California, to tort standards in Tennessee and
restrictions on tobacco ads in Massachusetts.”272 The reason for this is
an asymmetry between regulation and deregulation. If federal regulations are more demanding than state regulations on the same topic,
regulated parties will have to comply with the stricter federal rules;
preemption does not enter the conversation. But if federal regulations
are less demanding, preemption can serve to sweep aside stricter state
alternatives. The especially “expansive” approach to preemption
taken by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, accordingly, has had a
deregulatory effect.273
More familiar is federalism’s troubled relationship with issues of
race and civil rights. As discussed in Part II,274 American progressives
have long been “deeply skeptical of federalism”275 on account of its
historical use by defenders of slavery276 and, later, Jim Crow277 to promote white supremacy in the name of constitutional structure. The
racialized character of constitutional federalism doctrine persists to
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272 Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 133–34
(2004) (footnotes omitted); see also Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The
Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 342
(“Federal preemption is generally deregulatory—that is, preemption cases typically arise
only where a state government has regulated more strictly than has the national
government.”).
273 Diego A. Zambrano, Federal Expansion and the Decay of State Courts, 86 U. CHI. L.
REV. 2101, 2127–28 (2019) (citing empirical research on the Rehnquist Court’s embrace of
preemption and noting that “[t]he Roberts Court has cheerfully continued this trend with
expansive preemption rulings and even attempts to neuter abstention doctrines developed
in the 1970s”).
274 See supra notes 77–83 and accompanying text.
275 Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, 24 DEMOCRACY J., Spring 2012,
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/24/a-new-progressive-federalism [https://perma.cc/
LJ47-QCJL] [hereinafter Gerken, Progressive Federalism]. Gerken has been a leading
proponent of the view that such skepticism is no longer warranted or productive. See, e.g.,
Heather K. Gerken, Distinguished Scholar in Residence Lecture: A User’s Guide to
Progressive Federalism, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1087 (2017).
276 See, e.g., supra note 77 (discussing the nullification crisis); PAMELA BRANDWEIN,
RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRODUCTION OF
HISTORICAL TRUTH 36 (1999) (noting that an antebellum “consensus recognized that ‘state
sovereignty’ protected Southern slavery from federal reach”).
277 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 184 (2004) (describing Southern
politicians’ appeals to state autonomy in resisting civil rights reforms); Harry N. Scheiber,
Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism—An American Tradition: Modern Devolution
Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 234 (1996) (explaining that “for
nearly another century” after slavery’s abolition, federalism “served as a reliable fortress
for the perpetuation of systematic racial segregation and discrimination”).
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some extent into the present. The Roberts Court in Shelby County v.
Holder 278 struck down the Voting Rights Act’s coverage formula as
inconsistent with “the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty”
among states.279 This ruling “nullified the most important provision
ever passed to combat racial vote denial (and racial vote dilution)”280
and predictably led to new restrictions on the franchise and reduced
minority political participation in many of the same jurisdictions that
once invoked states’ rights to defend American apartheid.281
These examples do not imply that federalism always leads to
deregulatory spirals or diminishment of civil rights. On the contrary,
large progressive states may set pro-regulatory baselines that end up
being followed by smaller states282 or federal regulators283 when
Congress and the courts permit. Even when no such race to the top
occurs, stringent state laws can have spillover effects across jurisdictional lines.284 So, too, can federalism doctrines that allocate valuable
entitlements to the states have progressive distributional conse278

570 U.S. 529 (2013).
Id. at 544 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203
(2009)); Ilya Somin, Federalism and the Roberts Court, 46 PUBLIUS 441, 447 (2016)
(observing that “NFIB and Shelby County were easily the most consequential Supreme
Court federalism decisions of the post-New Deal era”).
280 Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Anti-Carolene Court, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 168.
281 See Desmond Ang, Do 40-Year-Old Facts Still Matter? Long-Run Effects of Federal
Oversight Under the Voting Rights Act, 11 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 1, 35 (2019)
(finding that after Shelby County, “while white turnout remained unchanged, minority
participation dropped by 2.1 percentage points” in previously covered jurisdictions); New
Voting Restrictions in America, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 19, 2019), https://
brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/new-voting-restrictions-america [https://
perma.cc/BQV3-LSFP] (collecting “hundreds of harsh measures making it harder to vote”
enacted by states in recent years).
282 See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 6 (1995) (describing a “California effect,” whereby “powerful and
wealthy ‘green’ political jurisdictions [promote] a regulatory ‘race to the top’ among their
trading partners”); see also Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:
Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (challenging the validity of race-to-the-bottom arguments in
the environmental context).
283 In perhaps the most famous modern example of this dynamic, federal law specifically
permits California to set stricter motor-vehicle emissions standards, and both other states
and the EPA have at times followed its lead. See VOGEL, supra note 282, at 259; Jessica
Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1277
(2009).
284 These spillovers interact with dormant commerce clause doctrine, under which, in
the absence of congressional consent, any state “statute that directly controls commerce
occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the
enacting State’s authority and is invalid.” Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). The
ability of states to regulate in ways that may have spillover effects thus turns in part on if,
when, and how courts deploy this extraterritoriality doctrine.
279
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quences under certain conditions.285 And many state and local governments provide protections for civil rights well above the floors
established by the federal Constitution and federal statutes.286
Yet even if “progressive federalism” is not an oxymoron and
indeed was particularly vibrant during the Trump Administration, it
remains fair to conclude that U.S. federalism is biased on net against
the contemporary Democratic agenda, especially in the areas of economic regulation and social welfare policy. Interjurisdictional competition and a host of structural constitutional law doctrines—
exemplified by preemption, anti-coercion, and equal sovereignty—
have all significantly set back this agenda. Political scientists have
explained, more broadly, how “federalism’s many venues generally
disadvantage groups with comprehensive, progressive policy aims.”287
And a large body of work by political economists, referenced above,
demonstrates that greater decentralization tends to lead to smaller
welfare states and lower public spending.288 Because federalism can
sometimes facilitate progressive electoral gains and policy outcomes,
understanding the structural biases associated with it requires close
examination of the details of particular arrangements.289 But it is
equally important not to miss the forest for the trees. Relative to more
centralized systems, the constitutional design of U.S. federalism has
helped conservatives and harmed progressives in ways that modern
developments have only partly unraveled.
6. Geography, Demography, and the Electoral System
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285 See Daniel J. Hemel, Federalism as a Safeguard of Progressive Taxation, 93 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1 (2018) (making this argument with regard to taxation).
286 See, e.g., Gerken, Progressive Federalism, supra note 275 (outlining ways in which
federalism can promote racial equality and minority rights). Liberals have long recognized
the rights-protecting potential of state constitutional law. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr.,
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
287 Lisa L. Miller, Federalism Is Unlikely to Save Progressive Politics, LAW & POL.
ECON. (July 11, 2019), https://lpeblog.org/2019/07/11/federalism-is-unlikely-to-saveprogressive-politics [https://perma.cc/XME3-YXJM].
288 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
289 See, e.g., Scott L. Greer, Introduction to FEDERALISM AND SOCIAL POLICY:
PATTERNS OF REDISTRIBUTION IN 11 DEMOCRACIES 1, 1 (Scott L. Greer & Heather Elliott
eds., 2019) (arguing that the “relationship between social democracy and federalism is all
in the rules”).
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The intersection of constitutional design and political geography
can give rise to numerous structural biases. The prevailing political
geography of the United States—in which Democrats predominate in
urban areas and inner-ring suburbs while Republicans predominate in
exurban and rural areas—tilts a host of longstanding structural
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arrangements in Republicans’ favor.290 We will be especially brief in
reviewing examples here, both because Part II already discussed this
intersection at length and because the examples are especially
familiar.291
Most obviously, constitutional rules that treat all states on equal
terms regardless of population will be biased toward parties that are
strongest in small states relative to rules that comply with some version of the one-person-one-vote principle. Today, the most sparsely
populated states tend to have Republican majorities, and Republicans
are far more likely than Democrats to be in the majority of more than
half the states even if they are in the minority nationwide.292 The
structure of the Senate rewards this geographic distribution by allocating to each state two senators and to each senator one vote.293
Because of the concentration of Democrats in large and medium-sized
states, Republicans can control the Senate even when Democrats win
a majority of all Senate votes cast in a given cycle.294 The Electoral
290

See supra notes 118–33 and accompanying text.
Our examples of biases in election law are illustrative rather than exhaustive. One
significant swath that we bracket for present purposes is campaign finance law, which, “like
other electoral laws, can obviously be a vehicle for . . . partisan advantage-seeking.”
Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The Constitutionalization
of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 130 (2004). We assume that certain rules
governing campaign finance are biased toward one party or the other, and some empirical
literature suggests as much. See, e.g., Nour Abdul-Razzak, Carlo Prato & Stephane
Wolton, After Citizens United: How Outside Spending Shapes American Democracy, 67
ELECTORAL STUD. 1, 18–19 (2020) (finding, based on an analysis of state legislative races,
that “Citizens United yielded an increase of approximately 11.5% in Republican seat
shares”); Andrew B. Hall, Systemic Effects of Campaign Spending: Evidence from
Corporate Contribution Bans in US State Legislatures, 4 POL. SCI. RSCH. & METHODS 343,
348 (2016) (showing a correlation between corporate campaign contribution bans and
Democratic state legislative seats). But more generally, the empirical evidence on the
relationship between campaign fundraising and electoral outcomes is mixed, see Yasmin
Dawood, Campaign Finance and American Democracy, 18 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 329,
340–42 (2015), and as far as we are aware, scholars have not demonstrated systematic
partisan bias in the contemporary U.S. campaign finance regime relative to plausible
alternative modes of financing campaigns in a two-party context.
292 See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text.
293 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
294 See, e.g., John D. Griffin, Senate Apportionment as a Source of Political Inequality, 31
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 405, 420 (2006) (“[T]he residents of states with less-than-average voting
weight [in the Senate] also tend to be more liberal and to identify with and vote for the
candidates of the Democratic Party.”); Ben Highton, How the Senate Is Biased Toward
Republicans, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2014, 2:44 PM), https://washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/31/how-the-senate-is-biased-toward-republicans [https://
perma.cc/V77L-R8D5] (documenting bias against Democrats in the Senate); Colin
McAuliffe, The Senate Is an Irredeemable Institution, DATA FOR PROGRESS (Dec. 17,
2019), https://dataforprogress.org/memos/the-senate-is-an-irredeemable-institution [https://
perma.cc/6T5P-623R] (documenting biases against Democrats and nonwhite Americans in
the Senate).
291
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College is not as biased as the Senate, given that it also takes into
account the size of each state’s House delegation, which is apportioned based on population.295 But by including each state’s two senators in its calculation of electors, the Electoral College puts a thumb
on the scale in favor of small states—which, again, in the contemporary United States are disproportionately conservative.296
While the Electoral College and the Senate are perennially relevant, more obscure features of our constitutional order are biased in
related ways. Ratifying a constitutional amendment proposed by
Congress requires the support of three-fourths of the states.297 The
Twelfth Amendment provides that if no candidate wins an Electoral
College majority, the election is settled in the House, with each state’s
House delegation casting one vote.298 Both of these provisions treat
large states and small states on equal terms and, as a result, generate a
conceptually similar (if less politically consequential) bias against contemporary Democrats.
The process for electing House members is also biased against
contemporary Democrats, though to a lesser degree. As explained in
Part II, the combination of single-member districts and the concentration of Democratic voters in urban areas means that Republicans consistently win an outsized percentage of House seats relative to the
percentage of votes received.299 So long as House elections use singlemember districts and partisans are geographically distributed as they
are, these elections will continue to be biased toward the Republican
Party relative to a system of proportional representation.300
43872-nyu_97-1 Sheet No. 60 Side B
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295 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (allocating to each state “a Number of Electors,
equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be
entitled in the Congress”).
296 See, e.g., Michael Geruso, Dean Spears & Ishaana Talesara, Inversions in US
Presidential Elections: 1836–2016, 14 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 327, 329–30 (2022)
(showing that the probability of an “inversion,” or an Electoral College victory for a
national-popular-vote loser, has been highly asymmetric across the parties in the past thirty
to sixty years: “conditional on an inversion occurring, the ex ante probability that it would
have been won by a Republican ranges from 62 percent to 93 percent across models we
analyze (in contrast to the ex post realization of 100 percent)”); see also Ian Millhiser, The
Astounding Advantage the Electoral College Gives to Republicans, in One Chart, VOX
(Sept. 17, 2019, 7:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/9/17/20868790/
republicans-lose-popular-vote-win-electoral-college [https://perma.cc/LZ8K-9J73].
297 U.S. CONST. art. V.
298 Id. amend. XII, cl. 3.
299 See supra notes 123–28 and accompanying text.
300 In part to counteract this bias, congressional Democrats have recently introduced
legislation that would eliminate single-member districts for House seats. See, e.g., Fair
Representation Act, H.R. 3863, 117th Cong. §§ 201–202 (2021) (requiring the use of
multimember districts in states with six or more House members and requiring smaller
states to elect all representatives on an at-large basis).
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See supra notes 134–40 and accompanying text.
Cf. Pozen, supra note 72, at 953 (noting that “at this moment in political time most
proposals to make it easier to vote would advance not only ‘small-d’ democratic values but
also ‘big-D’ Democratic interests”).
303 See Richard H. Pildes & G. Michael Parsons, The Legality of Ranked-Choice Voting,
109 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1775 (2021).
304 Id. at 1781; see also Rob Richie, Ranked Choice Voting May Affect Partisan
Outcomes, but It Always Helps Voters, FAIRVOTE (Nov. 9, 2018), https://fairvote.org/
ranked_choice_voting_may_affect_partisan_outcomes_but_it_always_helps_voters [https://
perma.cc/5364-SQD3] (providing examples of spoilers in U.S. Senate races from 1998 to
2016).
305 See Shigeo Hirano & James M. Snyder, Jr., The Decline of Third-Party Voting in the
United States, 69 J. POL. 1, 2 (2007).
302
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The intersection of demographic voting patterns and ballot access
rules also gives rise to structural bias. As explained in Part II,
Democrats today dominate among young and Black voters, while
older and white voters are core to the Republican base.301 These electoral features tee up attempts to grow or shrink the electorate along
demographic lines for partisan gain. Thus, Democrats rightly criticize
voter ID laws as being anti-Democratic as well as anti-democratic,
while Republicans plausibly fear that, for the foreseeable future, felon
reenfranchisement and automatic voter registration could harm their
electoral prospects relative to current voting rules.302
Finally, recent debates over ranked-choice voting (RCV) show
how structural biases can manifest differently depending on contingent facts on the ground. Under prevailing election rules in nearly
every U.S. jurisdiction, voters select one candidate and the winner is
the candidate who receives the most votes. Under RCV, voters rank
candidates from favorite to least favorite, the least popular candidates
are sequentially eliminated, and votes for candidates who have been
eliminated are reallocated based on voters’ preference ordering.303
RCV proponents argue that, among other benefits, it prevents
“spoiling,” in which “a minor-party candidate siphons enough votes
away from a major-party candidate to throw the race to the other
major-party candidate.”304 RCV could help Democrats in some races
by preventing spoiling by Green Party or other left-wing candidates.
In other races, where the would-be spoiler is instead a Libertarian or
other right-wing candidate, RCV could help Republicans. It is not
clear that either sort of race predominates today. But in the pre–New
Deal era, spoilers were significantly more common on the political
left,305 which meant that the prevailing first-past-the-post voting rules
were structurally biased against Democrats relative to RCV. Partly
because of this very phenomenon, the Democratic Party moved left to
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coopt support for such spoilers306—an excellent example of how structural biases can not only help or harm parties in specific periods but
also dynamically reshape party platforms and coalitions over time.
7. Constitutional Amendment Rules
The U.S. Constitution is “unusually, and probably excessively,
difficult to amend.”307 The rarity of amendment makes it hard to
directly observe any bias associated with this feature: Neither party
has made formal constitutional change central to its agenda in recent
decades, and partisan-identified amendment proposals have been
largely symbolic in nature.308 But at a minimum, even if the parties are
not divided in their general approach to revising the constitutional
text, the extraordinary difficulty of amending the U.S. Constitution
serves to reinforce those structural biases that are created by the
Constitution and that could be remedied only through amendment. To
the extent that such biases favor one political party overall, Article
V’s double-supermajoritarian process favors that party by functionally
entrenching them. Given the advantages afforded to contemporary
Republicans by the Senate, the Electoral College, and bicameralism,
among other hard-wired features of the Constitution, the analysis here
suggests that Article V can consequently be seen as biased toward
Republicans as well.
B. Unbiased Arrangements?

04/20/2022 12:00:09

306 See id. at 7–12. “The New Deal Democrats not only co-opted the progressive
agenda,” Hirano and Snyder contend, but also the Socialist Party’s agenda as well. Id. at 7
n.33.
307 Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237, 265
(Sanford Levinson ed., 1995); see id. at 261 tbl.11 (finding that the U.S. Constitution has
the world’s second most difficult amendment process behind only the now-defunct
Yugoslav Constitution).
308 See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 65, 116th Cong. (2019) (Republican-sponsored amendment to
allow Congress to ban desecration of the American flag); H.R.J. Res. 90, 112th Cong.
(2011) (Democratic-sponsored amendment in response to the Supreme Court’s Citizens
United decision).
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It may be tempting to conclude from the breadth of this Part’s
discussion that structural biases pervade every aspect of the constitutional order. Under certain circumstances and in certain eras, however, structural arrangements may not yield any discernible bias with
regard to the parties—even if they do make certain sorts of outcomes
more likely than others. Partisan structural biases generally do not
exist or do not become politically salient when any of several conditions holds.
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First, a structural arrangement will not be structurally biased for
or against one of the parties when it concerns an issue on which the
parties are each internally riven or otherwise not straightforwardly
polarized on ideological, geographic, or demographic grounds. Part I
offered, in stylized form, the example of the special legislative rules
governing trade agreements.309 Consider also the September 2001
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF).310 Over the past
two decades, presidents have broadly read this AUMF to justify use of
military force in the Middle East and North Africa, including against
groups that did not exist when the AUMF was passed.311 Relative to a
more conflict-specific authorization model, such an expansive and
unchecked arrangement is biased in favor of presidential power and
military interventionism. But it is not biased for or against either
Democrats or Republicans, given that each partisan camp contains
substantial hawkish and dovish elements. Just as presidents from both
parties have invoked the AUMF, skepticism of the AUMF has been
bipartisan as well, with legislators from both parties supporting efforts
to repeal312 or replace it.313 The 2001 AUMF shows how when an
issue crosscuts existing party coalitions, structural arrangements
bearing on the issue will be unlikely to generate persistent partisan
biases even if the arrangements do generate discernible policy biases.
Second, institutional arrangements typically will not generate
structural biases with respect to the parties when the arrangements do
not directly concern either policymaking or elections. As discussed in
Part I, the U.S. Constitution’s lack of a no-confidence mechanism may
create short-term winners and losers, but it does not seem to have a
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See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541
note) (authorizing the President “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations
or persons”).
311 See MATTHEW WEED, CONG. RSCH. SERV., PRESIDENTIAL REFERENCES TO THE 2001
AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN PUBLICLY AVAILABLE EXECUTIVE
ACTIONS AND REPORTS TO CONGRESS (2018).
312 See, e.g., Andrew Desiderio, House Committee Approves Repeal of 2001 Military
Authorization, DAILY BEAST (June 29, 2017, 4:55 PM), https://thedailybeast.com/housecommittee-approves-repeal-of-2001-military-authorization [https://perma.cc/W57T-H2JU]
(noting the near-unanimous vote of the House Appropriations Committee to repeal the
AUMF in 2017).
313 See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Tim Kaine, Senators Propose Legislation to Update
Authorities Used to Fight Terror Abroad (Apr. 16, 2018), https://kaine.senate.gov/pressreleases/senators-propose-legislation-to-update-authorities-used-to-fight-terror-abroad
[https://perma.cc/XB5N-NRLU] (noting bipartisan sponsorship of legislation to update the
AUMF in 2018).
310
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See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
See Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege Revived? Secrecy and Conflict During the
Bush Presidency, 52 DUKE L.J. 403, 404 (2002) (explaining that “every president since
George Washington has exercised some form of what is today called executive privilege”);
Kimberly Breedon & A. Christopher Bryant, Executive Privilege in a Hyper-Partisan Era,
64 WAYNE L. REV. 63, 64 (2018) (recounting instances from the Nixon to Obama
Administrations in which presidents have invoked executive privilege to justify
withholding information from Congress).
316 See generally Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National
Injunction Article, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417 (2017); Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the
“Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV. 920 (2020).
317 See Bray, supra note 316, at 458–59; Sohoni, supra note 316, at 922–23; Nicholas
Bagley & Samuel Bray, Judges Shouldn’t Have the Power to Halt Laws Nationwide,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 31, 2018), https://theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/end-nationwideinjunctions/574471 [https://perma.cc/7BMA-9XTG].
318 Bagley & Bray, supra note 317.
315
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more persistent partisan valence.314 Issues of executive privilege vis-àvis Congress provide another example. The executive branch’s ability
to withhold information from Congress can benefit either party in particular conflicts, depending on who controls which institutions. Presidents of both parties want to conceal some matters,315 and their
political opponents want to expose damaging details. It is hard to see,
however, why the degree of constitutional protection for such executive branch secret-keeping would have a systematic skew toward
either liberal or conservative policy outcomes or toward either
Democratic or Republican electoral victories.
Third, lack of sufficient information can cloud whether a bias
exists and in which direction it points. Consider the controversial practice of federal district court judges issuing nationwide injunctions.316
Nationwide injunctions can stymie policy objectives of both
Democratic and Republican presidents, as is evident from high-profile
injunctions issued during the Obama and Trump Administrations.317
A self-described bipartisan pair of legal scholars has characterized
nationwide injunctions as “equal-opportunity” threats to the parties.318 This seems to be the case at present. But one could imagine
more durable partisan patterns emerging in the years ahead if the
trend toward greater use of this tool continues or accelerates. This
would be especially true if judicial doctrine were to limit nationwide
injunctions to certain types of plaintiffs or cases that themselves have
a partisan cast. Even in the absence of such a doctrinal development, a
partisan split might emerge simply as a result of growing experience
with the practice and better evidence of its effects on Democratic and
Republican policy agendas. At least for now, though, nationwide
injunctions seem more or less neutral as between the two parties, and
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the parties’ positions on them can be expected to alternate based on
which controls the executive branch.319

STRUCTURAL BIASES

AND

IV
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

A fundamental force shaping American constitutional politics
today, we have argued, is the proliferation and intensification of structural biases against one party or the other throughout all three
branches of government. Many seemingly disparate debates in public
law come into clearer view—and reveal themselves to be variations on
the same debate—once one grasps this point. In this final Part, we pan
out to consider some broader implications of our analysis for constitutional conflict, constitutional reform, and constitutional scholarship,
both here and abroad.
A. Aggregate and Cumulative Structural Biases—and Pathways for
Debiasing
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319 During the Trump Administration, proposed bills to prevent district courts from
issuing nationwide injunctions were sponsored exclusively by Republicans. See Injunctive
Authority Clarification Act, H.R. 77, 116th Cong. (2019); Injunctive Authority
Clarification Act, H.R. 6730, 115th Cong. (2018).
320 See supra notes 69–71, 121–25 and accompanying text; supra Section III.A.6.
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Our focus thus far has been on specific constitutional arrangements and their partisan dimensions. But the typology in Part III also
enables a more comprehensive assessment. If one political party is disadvantaged by significantly more structural biases or by significantly
stronger biases than its rival in a given period, we might say that the
rival occupies a preferred constitutional position. This is especially
true if multiple structural biases are linked, such that a partisan advantage in one domain generates or exacerbates partisan advantage in
others. Is the U.S. constitutional order structurally biased at this
macro level?
The conclusion is debatable, but we read the evidence we have
assembled to suggest that the Republican Party currently enjoys such
an aggregate edge. As Parts II and III explained, Democrats are at a
structural disadvantage in winning control of the White House (owing
to the Electoral College), the Senate (owing to its apportionment
formula), and the House (owing to single-member districts, among
other factors).320 When they do manage to control these institutions,
Democrats face an extraordinary number of veto points across the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches—more than exist in any
other industrialized democracy—along with a suite of anti-secrecy and
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anti-earmark rules that inhibit dealmaking and impede their relatively
ambitious policy agendas.321
Moreover, many of these biases reinforce one another. Consider
a stylized account of the interlinkages among some of the best-known
structural biases we have discussed. The biases in the Electoral
College and Senate apportionment give Republicans an edge in
appointing and confirming Supreme Court Justices;322 which leads to a
more conservative Court; which is more likely to uphold Republican
state legislatures’ redistricting plans and voting restrictions while
striking down or narrowing federal voting rights and campaign finance
laws;323 which provides Republicans with further electoral advantages
beyond those already provided by the Electoral College and Senate;
and the cycle continues. While Part III presented each structural bias
individually for ease of exposition, the interactions across such
arrangements can help to shape, stabilize, and strengthen their asymmetric effects. Put simply, bias often builds upon bias.
A powerful underlying logic, then, helps explain why influential
voices within the Democratic coalition have increasingly turned
against longstanding features of the constitutional order and begun to
emphasize the need for “structural” reform.324 If there is anything surprising in this turn, it is that it took so long to come about.325
A party disadvantaged by a particular structural bias or set of
biases has two basic options. The party can either seek (1) to undo the
bias through legal revision, reinterpretation, or both; or (2) to adapt to
the bias by altering its agenda, its coalition, or both. The exceptional
procedural difficulty of amending the U.S. Constitution through
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See supra Sections III.A.1–.3.
See Zoffer & Grewal, supra note 122, at 454–58.
323 See, e.g., Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021) (narrowly
interpreting section 2 of the Voting Rights Act); Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S.
Ct. 1833 (2018) (upholding a state law allowing individuals to be removed from the rolls for
failing to vote); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (striking down the
preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310
(2010) (striking down a federal limit on corporations’ electioneering expenditures);
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (upholding a state voter
identification law); see also TUSHNET, supra note 242, at 110 (suggesting that the first
principle of the Roberts Court’s constitutional jurisprudence is that “[s]tatutes, policies,
and practices . . . that strengthen the Republican Party and weaken the Democratic Party
are constitutionally permissible”).
324 See supra notes 96–98, 115 and accompanying text.
325 Although many of the specific critiques and reform proposals are different, this
Democratic turn marks a return to the Progressive Era in its willingness to rethink
constitutional structures that limit state capacity and popular self-rule. See William E.
Forbath, The Will of the People? Pollsters, Elites, and Other Difficulties, 78 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1191, 1197 & n.32 (2010) (collecting sources on how “Progressives set out to remake
the constitutional order, root and branch”).
322
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Article V,326 together with cultural factors that make many Americans
hesitant to pursue revisions to the constitutional text,327 means that
option (1) will not be a realistic near-term possibility for certain
arrangements specified in the text, such as the Senate’s apportionment
formula. For all but the most rigidly entrenched arrangements, however, Democratic Party leaders have already started to explore
reforms that would reduce the Party’s disadvantage—both on their
own and through their dynamic feedback effects on associated
biases—such as by eliminating the legislative filibuster or establishing
an interstate compact that would award the presidency to the candidate who receives the most votes nationwide.328
We have no special insight into whether Democrats will succeed
in these institutional reform efforts. Many face steep odds. Yet even if
these efforts do not succeed, or succeed only in part, option (2)
remains available. Structural biases for or against the political parties,
as we have shown, are contingent on what the parties look like, both
in terms of their policy programs and their constituencies. And parties
are not constants. The history of parties in the United States has been
one of periodic realignments, in which various social groups decisively
switch allegiance from one party to the other.329
326

See supra Section III.A.7.
See Vicki C. Jackson, The (Myth of Un)amendability of the US Constitution and the
Democratic Component of Constitutionalism, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 575, 577–90 (2015)
(arguing that the formal difficulty of amending the U.S. Constitution is often overstated
and that cultural and ideological variables explain much of the United States’
comparatively low amendment rate).
328 See Pozen, supra note 59, at 338–45. Another variant of option (1) is to create a
countervailing institution with the goal of elevating the values or constituencies that are
marginalized by an existing arrangement. Within the executive branch, what Margo
Schlanger has called “Offices of Goodness” can be understood in this light. See generally
Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 53 (2014) (providing an extended case study of the Department of
Homeland Security’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties). More ambitiously,
Roberto Unger has proposed that countries create a “reconstructive branch,” a “branch of
government responsible for localized intervention in organizations or practices corrupted
by entrenched forms of social exclusion or subjugation.” ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER,
DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE 269 (1998). Although these
sorts of reforms have evident debiasing potential, any new countervailing institutions
established through the ordinary political process may lack the power to offset the most
significant structural biases, see, e.g., Schlanger, supra, at 112 (“Offices of Goodness are
inherently under siege; efforts to push them aside and render them irrelevant are part and
parcel of their agency’s mission focus.”), and may even end up reinforcing such biases
unless designed and managed with care, see generally, e.g., PREVENTING REGULATORY
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter &
David A. Moss eds., 2014) (discussing theories of regulatory capture, wherein government
agencies come to serve the interests of the actors they were designed to regulate).
329 See generally JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: ALIGNMENT
AND REALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1983).
327
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330 For one of numerous emerging plans to do so, see JANE KLEEB, HARVEST THE
VOTE: HOW DEMOCRATS CAN WIN AGAIN IN RURAL AMERICA (2020).
331 Cf. Jonathan Bernstein, Republicans Can’t Count on Electoral College Edge in 2024,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 22, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/202011-22/republican-electoral-college-edge-isn-t-built-in-to-the-u-s-voting-system [https://
perma.cc/M625-BPZ6] (outlining multiple scenarios that could yield “an electoral college
with smaller biases that fluctuate between (slightly) helping Democrats and Republicans”
as soon as 2024).
332 See, e.g., Stephanie Slade, Republicans Are Ripping Out “the Very Heart and Soul” of
Their Party, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2020), https://nytimes.com/2020/08/25/opinion/
republicans-libertarians-economics.html [https://perma.cc/GJZ7-BB4V] (contending that
the “Republican Party seems to become more comfortable with top-down economic
interventionism by the day”).
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When today’s party dynamics change, the salience and severity of
today’s structural biases may recede, and new biases may emerge,
even if institutional structures remain constant. Changes along any of
the axes of polarization that we discuss could mitigate or even reverse
existing biases. If, for instance, Democrats were to develop a significant base of rural support,330 the Senate and the Electoral College
would become less tilted in Republicans’ favor. The Electoral
College’s current bias is especially unstable: The “bluing” of Texas
alone has the potential to negate it.331 Likewise, if Republicans were
to make headway with voters of color, rules making it easier or harder
to cast a ballot would have less of a partisan valence. If the
Republican Party platform were to call for more active government
intervention in economic affairs, a trend that some commentators
believe is already underway,332 the myriad veto points in the policy
process would no longer differentially disadvantage Democratic
agendas to the same degree.
As these examples suggest, the dismantling of structural bias can
be the product of top-down reform and highly coordinated mobilization. But it can also arise from unplanned and highly diffuse developments, such as migratory movements across regions, evolving political
views within demographic groups, or generational shifts in ideological
orientation. Broad changes in the character of the parties or their constituencies would not change evaluations of structural arrangements
from the standpoint of values like equality or democracy. They could,
however, go a long way toward minimizing the disparate partisan
impacts that institutional arrangements presently produce and the
constitutional conflict that can follow.
In short, because structural biases are co-produced by institutions
and politics, changes to either could unsettle the biases. Most critical
commentary in this area has focused on the institutional side of the
ledger, and the ways in which certain constitutional features distribute
power unevenly among various social blocs. But a more dialectical
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understanding of structural bias casts these maldistributions in a
somewhat different light. Descriptively speaking, if any given feature
becomes biased against a political party, the reason lies as much with
the party—and its ideological, geographic, and demographic composition—as with the Constitution.
B. Constitutional Polarization and Contestation
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333 See David E. Pozen, Eric L. Talley & Julian Nyarko, A Computational Analysis of
Constitutional Polarization, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2019) (outlining the theoretical
basis for these alternative hypotheses).
334 See id. at 12 (noting that “the nature, degree, and determinants of constitutional
polarization [and] the relationship of constitutional polarization to nonconstitutional
polarization” remain “untested in mainstream constitutional law scholarship” (punctuation
omitted)).
335 Cf. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford V. Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1062 (2001) (distinguishing between “low politics,”
involving struggles over who will hold power, and “high politics,” involving struggles over
“larger political principles and ideological goals”).
336 David E. Pozen, Eric L. Talley & Julian Nyarko, Republicans and Democrats Are
Describing Two Different Constitutions, ATLANTIC (June 2, 2019), https://theatlantic.com/
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The previous Parts provided an account of how multiple overlapping forms of polarization have created or exacerbated structural
biases throughout the U.S. constitutional order, which in turn has
reinforced polarization and created or exacerbated conflict over a
growing list of institutions. The details of this account are specific to
this period in U.S. constitutional history. But we can also draw some
more general lessons.
First, the account suggests a key mechanism by which partisan
polarization translates into polarization over constitutional matters.
Even though partisan polarization is a well-known and much-studied
phenomenon, its constitutional analog remains a relatively obscure
subject. The constitutional theory literature furnishes contradictory
hypotheses as to whether constitutional polarization ought to be more
extreme, less extreme, or essentially coterminous with partisan polarization.333 The empirical literature on this relationship is thin.334 Our
account explains why it is rational for highly polarized, closely divided
parties to develop divergent views on a growing list of constitutional
arrangements: because under such conditions, more and more of these
arrangements will have become more and more tilted against one
party and in favor of the other. The concept of structural bias supplies
the link between “low” partisan politicking and “high” constitutional
contestation.335 If Americans increasingly have come to see the
Constitution less “as a symbol of unity and common purpose” than as
a source of “partisan strife,”336 this is in no small part because the
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ideas/archive/2019/06/democrats-and-republicans-have-different-constitutions/590005
[https://perma.cc/MXP8-8BES] (internal quotation marks omitted).
337 Akhil Reed Amar, American Constitutionalism—Written, Unwritten, and Living, 126
HARV. L. REV. F. 195, 197 (2013). For prominent accounts of constitutions as coordination
devices, see RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 16,
26–28, 87–88 (1999); RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW:
THEORIES AND LIMITS 71–76 (2015); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 910–19 (1996).
338 See Pozen, supra note 21, at 39–47; Brownstein, supra note 109; cf. Josh Chafetz,
Unprecedented? Judicial Confirmation Battles and the Search for a Usable Past, 131 HARV.
L. REV. 96, 111–19 (2017) (tracing earlier cycles of rising legislative obstructionism leading
to institutional reform). Over two-thirds of the 2020 Democratic presidential candidates
either supported ending the legislative filibuster or expressed openness to the idea. See
Kevin Uhrmacher, Kevin Schaul & Jeff Stein, Where 2020 Democrats Stand on Democratic
Changes, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2020), https://washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/policy2020/voting-changes [https://perma.cc/HW2Z-RNTJ].
339 See Elinson & Gould, supra note 113 (manuscript at 45–52).
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Constitution increasingly invites partisan strife through institutions
that systematically undermine the electoral and policy goals of one or
the other major party.
Second, and relatedly, our account suggests that partisan critiques
of a constitutional order are likely to be lagging rather than leading
indicators of polarization. Among other functions, structural constitutional arrangements serve as “‘focal point[s]’ for social coordination.”337 Political insiders will typically have strong incentives to leave
such coordination devices intact. Only once a party has been persistently thwarted in achieving its goals will it be likely to turn against a
structural arrangement in any concerted fashion. Consistent with this
claim, the contemporary Democratic turn against the filibuster followed directly from the obstructionism of Senate Republicans during
the Obama Administration,338 while contemporary Republican antipathy to Chevron grew out of the ways in which the Obama
Administration used agency initiatives to accomplish progressive
policy ends.339 Growing polarization about policy has been a feature
of U.S. politics for decades, but it takes time for that polarization to
catalyze structural constitutional conflict.
Third, if it is correct that structural constitutional biases motivate
disadvantaged political actors to challenge the relevant arrangements,
then cataloging the structural biases in any given system—as Part III
does for the United States—may not only illuminate its current constitutional politics but also help forecast future constitutional conflicts.
Some of the arrangements we have discussed are already the subject
of legal and political contestation. But other structurally biased
arrangements, from bicameralism to single-member legislative districting to various veto points in the administrative process, have not
yet elicited any significant political opposition. A number of factors
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340 See, e.g., EVANS, supra note 193, at 223 (noting that majority party leaders in the
U.S. Congress “lack powerful sanctions for enforcing party discipline”). Such intraparty
divisions have impeded Democratic efforts to eliminate or modify the legislative filibuster
during the current Congress. See, e.g., Jason Lemon, Schumer Calls Out Manchin, Sinema
over Filibuster, Voting Rights: ‘Get This Done,’ NEWSWEEK (July 22, 2021, 12:52 PM),
https://www.newsweek.com/schumer-calls-out-manchin-sinema-over-filibuster-votingrights-get-this-done-1612278 [https://perma.cc/Q3FR-93ZU].
341 Cf. Bagley, supra note 59, at 369–400 (suggesting that tropes of legitimacy and
accountability have prevented the political left from turning against administrative
procedure, despite its systematically anti-progressive effects).
342 On the risks posed by such fights themselves, separate from the issues being fought
over, see, for example, STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE
215–17 (2018); Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 57, at 964–65.
343 ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 7 (2009) (identifying such a belief as the basic condition of
constitutional endurance).
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may explain why such arrangements go unchallenged. Disadvantaged
actors may conclude that the benefits from reform are not worth the
cost of its pursuit, adjusted for the (potentially very low) probability
of success. Party leaders might be unable to rein in members who
oppose reform for idiosyncratic philosophical or electoral reasons.340
In some instances, prevailing legal or political ideologies may make it
difficult for partisans to imagine alternatives to institutions that are
biased against them, or even to recognize that the bias exists.341 All
that said, the more biased any given constitutional arrangement
becomes, the more rational it becomes for negatively affected parties
to fight back. Part III’s conceptual map of contemporary biases,
accordingly, might also be seen as a kind of heatmap—both to existing
sites of structural struggle and to possible constitutional conflicts in
waiting.
Fourth, our account suggests that conflict over structural bias
holds promise as well as peril for a mature democracy. The downside
risks are straightforward and significant. Political fights over structural
constitutional arrangements open the door to escalating forms of constitutional hardball, countermajoritarian practices, and institutional
instability that together make effective governance increasingly difficult if not impossible.342 When structural biases become so severe that
they cause party leaders from one side or the other to despair of
advancing their agenda through ordinary legal and political channels—when these elites no longer “believe they are better off within
the current constitutional bargain than in taking a chance on, and
expending resources in, negotiating a new one”343—they can undermine the functioning of a constitutional order writ large. In extremis,
perceptions of structural bias can lead to political revolt and constitutional breakdown.
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Yet at the same time, mounting conflict over structural bias of the
sort that the United States has been experiencing is by no means a
clear sign of constitutional retrogression or democratic decay. Such
fights represent a maturation of our politics insofar as both parties
have gained—or regained344—recognition of their fundamental interests in constitutional design and are arguing for change or stasis
accordingly. Such fights also represent a revolt against dead-hand control insofar as participants seek to revise outworn terms of the constitutional order rather than maneuver within them. And any number of
specific structural reforms, including removal of the Senate filibuster,
may well create stable new equilibria in our political institutions
rather than escalating cycles of partisan retribution.345
Constitutional changes motivated by structural bias could also
have salutary effects from the standpoint of more general values. A
tension between the value of democratic equality and, say, the constitutional status of the District of Columbia or the design of the
Electoral College has existed since the Founding. But this tension
alone has not been sufficient to prompt political reform.346 Now that
the partisan tilt of these institutions has become clear, reform proposals have gained momentum.347 In this way, structural bias can lead
partisans to identify and invest in structural constitutional reforms
that are normatively desirable on principled grounds, independent of
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344 See supra Section II.A (describing cycles of conflict over structural constitutional
biases throughout U.S. history).
345 The Senate has been on a gradual slide toward majority rule since the 1970s. It has
lowered the cloture threshold, created and then expanded exceptions to the cloture
requirement (most notably the budget reconciliation process), and eliminated the filibuster
for judicial and executive branch nominations. See GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC
SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER: OBSTRUCTION AND LAWMAKING IN THE U.S. SENATE 89 (2006)
(discussing the move to a three-fifths cloture requirement); Dauster, supra note 261, at
645–56 (discussing nominations); supra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing
reconciliation). Fully eliminating the legislative filibuster would result in the Senate
operating as a majority-rule body, like most other U.S. legislative chambers, without
creating obvious opportunities for additional strategic manipulation of voting rules. Cf.
Doerfler & Moyn, supra note 110, at 1768–71 (comparing “spiraling” risks posed by Courtpacking schemes with “the non-spiraling virtue” of other structural reforms).
346 But cf. JESSE WEGMAN, LET THE PEOPLE PICK THE PRESIDENT: THE CASE FOR
ABOLISHING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 126–62 (2020) (explaining that Supreme Court
decisions ratifying the ideal of “one person, one vote” helped catalyze the last major push
to overhaul the Electoral College, in the late 1960s).
347 See Pozen, supra note 59, at 339 (“Proposals to grant statehood to the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico through federal legislation have moved from the margins to the
mainstream of the Democratic Party.”); Edward B. Foley, Want to Fix Presidential
Elections? Here’s the Quickest Way., POLITICO MAG. (May 4, 2019), https://politico.com/
magazine/story/2019/05/04/electoral-college-reform-2020-226792 [https://perma.cc/N66CAJVZ] (reviewing Electoral College reform proposals and workarounds currently “on the
table”).
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which party would benefit for the foreseeable future. The norms of
constitutional argument, moreover, require advocates to defend most
proposals in nonpartisan terms,348 thus ensuring that considerations of
political morality animate the reform conversation regardless of what
brings participants into it.
C. Broader Lessons for Constitutional Designers, Empiricists, and
Theorists
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348 See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1350 (2006)
(“American constitutional culture supplies practices of argument that channel the
expression of disagreement into claims about the meaning of a shared tradition, teaching
advocates to express claims of partisan conviction in the language of public value.”); see
also Pozen & Samaha, supra note 5, at 753–56 (explaining that “partisan arguments” are
seen as illegitimate in debates over constitutional meaning).
349 Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105, 118
(1988) (describing the Constitution’s structural provisions as “relatively dry” compared to
its rights provisions).
350 See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
351 Nineteenth-century Belgium, for example, gave multiple votes to citizens with more
property and education as a means of limiting the number of seats won by radical or
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Other potential lessons are still broader. While we have focused
on U.S. constitutionalism, the concept of structural bias is itself a tool
for constitutional analysis in any time or place. For politicians and
practitioners, attention to structural bias can inform constitutional
drafting and reform efforts. For scholars, including both constitutional
lawyers and social scientists, attention to structural bias can inform a
variety of positive and normative projects.
Constitutional designers are not benevolent social planners operating under a veil of ignorance but embedded political actors seeking
to promote substantive ends. By making some electoral or policy outcomes more likely than others, the strategic creation of structural
biases may serve these ends—all the more so if the strategy is made
less salient by being located in a “relatively dry” structural arrangement rather than a rights guarantee.349 Constitutional designers might,
for example, intentionally create institutions that over- or underrepresent certain groups in the political process, relative to their numbers. As discussed briefly above, the framers of the U.S. Constitution
were highly attentive to which sorts of Americans would be empowered and disempowered by various institutional arrangements, sometimes in subtle ways.350 Other nations’ constitutions have more
explicitly augmented the voting rights of specified subpopulations—
sometimes as a means of entrenching the clout of currently privileged
groups,351 sometimes as a means of empowering women or racial,
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ethnic, or religious minorities.352 Constitutional designers may also
make certain sorts of policy change easier or harder to achieve, as by
calibrating rules regarding voting thresholds or agenda-setting procedures.353 In other instances, constitutional designers may seek more
directly to aid allies or undermine opponents. Chile’s 1980 constitution, for instance, created “authoritarian enclaves” that allowed
Pinochet regime loyalists in the armed forces to intervene in the political process, locking in a rightward bias that was only slowly chipped
away by constitutional reformers in subsequent years.354
There is a limit to how effectively constitutional designers can
engineer structural biases, however. As we have discussed throughout,
these biases ebb and flow over time, and sometimes reverse directionality altogether. Institutional arrangements are created in the context
of the politics of their era. Decades or centuries later, they may have
very different welfare and distributional implications than they had at
the outset. The contemporary partisan bias associated with the
District of Columbia’s lack of statehood, for example, arises from the
fact that its residents overwhelmingly support Democrats.355 This particular bias could hardly have been anticipated at the Founding, long
before anything like today’s party system had emerged and Black
Americans (the largest demographic group in the District) had been
guaranteed the right to vote.356
For constitutional designers, this dynamic calls for a dose of
humility. All constitutional drafters and reformers work from an
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socialist parties. See PAUL E. STARR, ENTRENCHMENT: WEALTH, POWER, AND THE
CONSTITUTION OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES 112 (2019).
352 Official quotas for women and minority groups, for instance, exist in dozens of
national parliaments, sometimes by explicit constitutional guarantee. See Mona L. Krook
& Diana Z. O’Brien, The Politics of Group Representation: Quotas for Women and
Minorities Worldwide, 42 COMPAR. POL. 253, 256–58 (2010) (conducting a transnational
survey of such quotas).
353 See generally Huq, supra note 191, at 1418–43 (cataloging “agenda-control
instruments” in U.S. constitutional law).
354 See Claudio A. Fuentes, Shifting the Status Quo: Constitutional Reforms in Chile, 57
LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 99, 105–10 (2015).
355 See John J. Hudak, The Politics and History of the D.C. Statehood Vote, BROOKINGS
(June 25, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/06/25/the-politics-and-historyof-the-d-c-statehood-vote [https://perma.cc/8BXU-2QPB] (highlighting that since the 2000
presidential election, the Democratic presidential nominee has captured eighty-nine
percent of the vote in the District on average).
356 One might argue that the Founders could have predicted that residents of the federal
district would tend to support the party that favors greater federal government
expenditures and greater centralization of power in the capital. Even if this is indeed the
case, many of the leading reasons why the District of Columbia consistently votes in favor
of Democrats—namely, high support for today’s Democratic Party among city dwellers,
Black Americans, and persons of all races with high educational attainment—are not ones
that could have been anticipated at the Founding.
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357 See Laurence Broers, In Armenia, a Constitutional Power Grab Backfires, CHATHAM
HOUSE (Apr. 24, 2018), https://chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/armenia-constitutionalpower-grab-backfires [https://perma.cc/3PLA-XCN3] (describing how the move to
parliamentary elections, though intended to fracture opponents of the ruling Republican
Party, precipitated mass nonviolent protests that led to the resignation of the Republican
Party’s leader).
358 See, e.g., supra notes 134–50 and accompanying text.
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understanding of society that is necessarily time-bounded to some
degree. As a result, attempts to create structural biases are almost
sure to have unintended consequences if a constitution endures. Still
more humbling, attempts to avoid structural bias in pursuit of designs
that will be neutral among political factions are likewise apt to prove
quixotic. Older constitutions, such as those in the United States
(1787), Belgium (1831), Argentina (1853), and Canada (1867), are
especially susceptible to these shifts. But structural biases can come
and go even in a short space of time. To take just one recent example,
Armenia switched in 2015 to a parliamentary system in a manner that
was intended to entrench that country’s Republican Party but that, by
2018, had produced the opposite effect.357 Structural biases for or
against a given party emerge on account of certain contingent social
facts, and they last only as long as the relevant facts last.
If constitutional designers have much to lose from the dynamic
character of structural biases, constitutional scholars have much to
learn from the ways in which such change occurs. This Article has
tried to provide a framework for understanding which sorts of political actors will be advantaged or disadvantaged by sometimes
technical-seeming design choices. In so doing, it has offered a broad,
and necessarily incomplete, portrait of the structural constitutional
biases that currently affect the two major political parties in the
United States. In addition to filling in more details of this portrait and
developing similar inventories for other constitutional systems,
scholars could extend the inquiry backward in time—analyzing the
historical development of specific constitutional institutions through
the lens of the electoral and policy biases that they have generated in
different eras.
Scholars could also extend the inquiry outward from the parties—investigating structural biases with regard to additional groups,
such as political blocs that operate on the periphery of the party
system and demographic groups of various kinds. Parts II and III consider disparate effects of structural arrangements on racial and other
demographic groups indirectly, through the lens of partisan bias,358
but direct treatments could allow for significantly more nuance.
Another extension of the project might look to how political actors
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359 See, e.g., Levinson & Sachs, supra note 27, at 402–03 (discussing political
implications of Republican anti-union efforts).
360 See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 242, at 63 (explaining that plaintiff-side trial lawyers
have historically been strong supporters of the Democratic Party and describing recent
Supreme Court decisions on these subjects as amounting to a “program of defunding the
left through constitutional interpretation”).
361 See Jonathan S. Gould, The Law of Legislative Representation, 107 VA. L. REV. 765,
805–11 (2021); Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and
the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 828–45 (2014).
362 See Kenneth A. Shepsle, The Changing Textbook Congress, in CAN THE
GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 238, 248–56 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989)
(describing reforms during this period).
363 See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle over Meaning, 25 CONN. L.
REV. 869, 870–73 (1993) (discussing this example and defining ideological drift as change
over time in the normative or political valence of “[s]tyles of legal argument, theories of
jurisprudence, and theories of constitutional interpretation”); Pozen, supra note 193, at
106–07 (discussing this example and defining ideological drift with reference to “ideas”).
364 See, e.g., supra Section I.A, notes 114–17 and accompanying text.
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seek to use nonstructural legal rules to debilitate the opposition.
Observers have noted, for example, that contemporary conservative
initiatives to weaken private-sector unions359 and limit punitive
damage awards and class action lawsuits360 may double as efforts to
undermine the financial base of the Democratic Party. Moreover,
while we have focused on biases that benefit one political party over
the other, legal structures empower or disempower factions within the
parties. Different modes of conducting primary elections or financing
electoral campaigns, for instance, may favor either more moderate or
more extreme party members.361 And as with interparty biases,
intraparty biases may lead disadvantaged factions to seek to change
the rules of the larger political game; successful efforts in the 1970s by
liberal congressional Democrats to reform the seniority system and
other procedures that were benefiting more conservative Democratic
committee chairs can be understood in precisely this light.362
Because structural biases arise not from constitutional design
alone but from its interaction with broader political forces, questions
of structural bias will often lie at the intersection of constitutional law
and other fields, including history, political science, and sociology.
Legal scholars are accustomed to thinking about the ideological drift
of constitutional ideas, such as the notion of “colorblindness” in equal
protection doctrine.363 The evolution of structural biases underscores
the need to think about the ideological drift of constitutional institutions as well. Tracing the rise and fall of structural biases can be a
useful metric both for measuring political change and for demarcating
constitutional epochs.
As some of our earlier observations suggest,364 one particularly
promising line of interdisciplinary inquiry concerns the influence of
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structural biases on longer-term political development. Much of our
descriptive analysis of contemporary U.S. constitutionalism has
treated the parties and their coalitions as fixed, or as exogenous to
constitutional design. But structure can shape the development of the
parties and their coalitions over time. Without the potential for thirdparty “spoilers” created by first-past-the-post voting, the Democratic
Party would not have felt so much pressure to move left during the
New Deal Era.365 Conversely, without the advent of the “superdelegate” system, Democratic presidential candidates might have felt
greater pressure to move left in recent decades.366 Meanwhile, without
the advantages that come from the design of the Electoral College and
the Senate, the Republican Party would have had no choice but to
pursue policies and messages aimed at attracting more voters of
color.367 Structural constitutional rules can affect what positions parties take, how they build their coalitions, and how political preferences are constructed in the first place. Extralegal forces matter too,
of course; an individualistic culture is sometimes said to explain much
of the path of American political development.368 Yet however important cultural variables might be, “the interaction of culture and institutions is to some extent self-reinforcing.”369 The idea that party
evolution and competition could be understood without reference to
structural constitutional law, and the biases this law produces, turns
out to be every bit as fanciful as the idea that a commercial marketplace could be understood as “free” of the background legal rules that
allow it to function.370
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See supra notes 303–06 and accompanying text.
Supporters of socialist candidate Bernie Sanders advanced a particularly forceful
version of this argument during the 2016 presidential primary. See Heather Gautney, Dear
Democratic Party: It’s Time to Stop Rigging the Primaries, GUARDIAN (June 11, 2018, 6:00
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/11/democrat-primaryelections-need-reform [https://perma.cc/RTJ2-LAVN] (“In 2016, the progressive grassroots
wing of the Democratic party, which strongly supported Sanders, raised persistent alarms
about the blatant structural bias of the primary system.”). We have not been able to find
any systematic academic research on the ideological or factional biases that Democrats’
superdelegate rules, first adopted in the early 1980s, may have generated within the party.
367 See supra notes 118–50 and accompanying text.
368 See, e.g., L OUIS H ARTZ , T HE L IBERAL T RADITION IN A MERICA : A N
INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 9 (1955)
(describing “dogmatic liberalism” as “the secret root from which have sprung many of the
most puzzling of American cultural phenomena”); SEYMOUR M. LIPSET & GARY MARKS,
IT DIDN’T HAPPEN HERE: WHY SOCIALISM FAILED IN THE UNITED STATES 97–98, 265–66
(2000) (discussing political culture as a reason for the failure of European-style socialism in
the United States).
369 LIPSET & MARKS, supra note 368, at 265.
370 On the fancifulness of the latter idea, see generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE
ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER (2011).
366
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371 See Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1419 (2007)
(describing “a well-trodden path in political theory . . . explaining the propensity of singleseat, single-winner elections to produce two and only two relatively stable, relatively
centrist parties”).
372 See, e.g., LIPSET & MARKS, supra note 368, at 43–84 (providing a skeptical
reconstruction of standard arguments about how the United States’ two-party system and
federalist structure prevented the emergence of socialism).
373 See generally, e.g., GEORG LUKÁCS, HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS (Rodney
Livingstone trans., Merlin Press 1971) (1923); EVGENY B. PASHUKANIS, LAW AND
MARXISM: A GENERAL THEORY (Barbara Einhorn trans., Pluto Publishing Ltd., 1989)
(1924).
374 Cf. Gregory A. Elinson, Divided Parties, Separated Powers 16–30 (Feb. 15, 2021)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3751638 [https://perma.cc/R94DUDLY] (reviewing literature on intraparty fragmentation).
375 See supra Section I.C.
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Indeed, the most profound structural biases may be the least visible. Entrenched constitutional structures may be so deeply biased
against certain political or policy positions that those positions essentially disappear from mainstream debate, with the result that few see
the bias anymore. Many have suggested, for example, that the U.S.
constitutional framework led more or less inexorably to a two-party
system.371 To the extent this is true, the central players in both the
Democratic and Republican coalitions can be seen as beneficiaries of
our constitutional design, while those at the fringes of the party
system are harmed by existing constitutional structures relative to
alternative arrangements such as proportional representation. Some
of the same institutional features of U.S. constitutionalism may have
likewise prevented socialism from gaining strength here as compared
to in other nations.372 Whether or not these features are themselves
manifestations or epiphenomena of even deeper antisocialist biases in
the very idea of constitutionalism or rule of law,373 structural constitutional rules have plainly played a role in channeling and constraining
political-ideological formation. Furthermore, a two-party system in a
large and diverse country tends to stimulate ongoing ideological conflict inside the necessarily heterogenous major parties.374 Fights over
structural biases, as we have emphasized throughout, take place
within a politics that is partially constructed by those biases.
Structural biases are also fertile ground for empirical scholars. As
discussed in Part I, this Article is a close cousin of scholarship in comparative political science and political economy exploring the impacts
of various governance arrangements.375 Most of that scholarship has
been quantitative in approach, focused on national constitutions, and
limited to macro-level design questions such as presidential versus
parliamentary systems. Relaxing any of those constraints could yield
fruitful research agendas oriented around qualitative methods, subna-
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Myerson, supra note 22, at 927.
Michael C. Dorf, Spandrel or Frankenstein’s Monster? The Vices and Virtues of
Retrofitting in American Law, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 339, 342 (2012).
378 See, e.g., Joseph Fishkin & William Forbath, Reclaiming Constitutional Political
Economy: An Introduction to the Symposium on the Constitution and Economic Inequality,
94 TEX. L. REV. 1287 (2016); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Political Economy of “Constitutional
Political Economy,” 94 TEX. L. REV. 1527 (2016).

43872-nyu_97-1 Sheet No. 70 Side A

tional constitutions, or meso-level arrangements, including arrangements governing the internal operation of institutions. To date, broad
questions concerning the electoral and policy effects of constitutional
design choices have largely been the domain of quantitative social
scientists. This disciplinary division of labor has left legal scholars on
the sidelines of some of the most important debates about how structural constitutional law affects their societies. Yet as this Article has
demonstrated, no econometric pyrotechnics are needed. A lawyerly
concern for institutional detail and careful counterfactual reasoning
can identify structural biases arising from any number of complex constitutional rules.
Attention to structural bias can enrich normative analysis as well.
In circumstances where a structural arrangement is strongly biased
against one political party or against a desirable policy outcome, that
bias may be reason alone to condemn the arrangement. More generally, in circumstances where every plausible specification of a constitutional institution is likely to be biased relative to competitors, the
ideal of “neutrality” loses purchase. Some political bloc is going to be
made better or worse off by any set of rules, relative to realistic alternatives. This observation counsels that we look beyond political neutrality and procedural fairness to more substantive normative
criteria—whether keyed to democracy, equality, social welfare, or
other values—for evaluating “the rules of the game by which politicians gain and use power.”376 Meanwhile, the observation that many
structural biases are the product not just of strategic behavior but of
unanticipated social and political developments should prompt us to
interrogate how all such biases operate and whether they are justifiable. “Reflecting on the accidental quality of our institutions and practices,” Michael Dorf has noted, “can be a first step toward examining
their efficacy relative to other possible arrangements.”377
In sum, a focus on structural bias facilitates politically grounded,
mid-level work on the practical and distributional implications of constitutional institutions. Such work has been in short supply in the legal
academy. A number of prominent U.S. constitutional scholars have
called in recent years for a reorientation of the field toward “constitutional political economy,”378 or toward “law and political economy”
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more broadly,379 while leaving open exactly what such a reorientation
might entail. The concept of structural bias provides one means of
organizing and advancing the constitutional-political-economy project
across issue areas.
CONCLUSION

379 See, e.g., Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & K. Sabeel
Rahman, Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the TwentiethCentury Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784 (2020).
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The idea of structural constitutional biases might seem obvious.
After all, even casual observers of contemporary U.S. politics know
that many Democrats view the design of the Senate and the Electoral
College as giving an edge to Republicans. But such biases, this Article
has argued, are much broader and deeper than has been appreciated—broader in that they now pervade virtually every part of our
constitutional order, and deeper in that they shape not only a discrete
set of electoral outcomes but also countless government decisions and
policy paths taken and not taken. At the same time, such biases are
more contingent and dynamic than many assume. Whether and to
what extent any given constitutional arrangement advantages or disadvantages any given political party in any given period depends on
the nature of the parties and their coalitions. Structural biases are
therefore liable to change as American politics changes, sometimes in
response to those very same biases.
Attending to structural bias enables us to think more clearly
about both domestic and comparative constitutionalism. It can help
scholars trace the relationships between partisan polarization and constitutional design, analyze the distributional and aggregate effects of
constitutional arrangements, theorize the conditions for large-scale
constitutional conflict and change, and evaluate how constitutions are
performing relative to other constitutions and to the aims of their
framers. The idea unifies existing work in several fields while pointing
to new areas of inquiry. Although this Article’s focus has been on the
contemporary United States, its basic methodology and lessons generalize broadly. Any student of constitutional politics stands to benefit
from inquiring into the structure of structural bias in their own system.
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